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Introduction
Practitioners in ﬁnance have been trying to either maximize their fortunes or
minimize any unlucky outcomes;say, Beat the market. The uncertainty is always
something to fear or to overcome in ﬁnancial market in order to beat the market.
The price of assets seems unpredictable in a short-time interval, though academics
consider market price would stay at equilibrium in the long-run, as reﬂecting funda-
mentals in the end. As “Eﬃciency of Financial Market” says; price of assets reveals
all relevant information. The continuous-time random walk is successfully taken as
close as tracking down the asset price movements. Moreover, a regime-switching be-
tween good versus bad state abruptly occurs over the business cycle (or the ﬁnancial
cycle). Hence, two key theoretical devices used to model risk in ﬁnance are ﬁrst, to
acknowledge that we see the movements of asset price micmic a random walk in a
continuous manner and second, to acknowledge that we observe the state of a world
seems to switch from one to another regime. In this thesis, I investigate how time
variation in risks and uncertainty aﬀects ﬁrm’s funding decisions as well as market’s
aggregates movements.
Nevertheless, it has been an important question how ﬁrms decide their external
ﬁnancing to undertake NPV projects. Modigliani and Miller present the famous
irrelevant theorem; in a frictionless world, the type of external ﬁnancing does not
matter. Later, Miller complements his irrelevance proposition with a tax argument.
The trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs optimally determines ﬁrm’s
leverage. Assuming that the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow mimics a random walk, this helps a
ﬁrm to rebalance its leverage in a continuous manner in order to manage its default
risk. A ﬁrm with higher volatility of earnings appreciates for its ability to adjust its
debt level as long as it can aﬀord its issuing costs of new debts. Short-term debt
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is considered to mitigate in agency conﬂicts in investment decisions; furthermore it
enables its downward adjustment of leverage when it hit by negative shocks, by letting
them matured. In this way, a ﬁrm historically issued short-term debt can issue more
debts ceteris paribus. We ﬁnd the evidence from U.S. industrial ﬁrm’s bond issuance
data.
Our second question starts with a ﬁrm susceptible to downward systemic risks,
for instance, a bank. Bank’s failure in historical perspectives goes along the ﬁnan-
cial cycle as well as its risk-taking behaviour. Once its risk-taking behaviour might
cause its failure, the consequence of bank failure should be internalized within cap-
ital market in this regards. After the recent 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis, regulatory
agencies discipline banks to implement a loss-absorbing mechanism in bank’s balance
sheet by issuing contingent capitals;Cocos. We model the specialty of ﬁrms associated
with the business cycle with a regime-switching framework. We found that the state
contingent coupon rate mitigates a ﬁrm’s liquidity shortage in times of bad state of
economy. Finally, we are interested in the interactions among aggregate ﬁnancial
index; margin, S&P 500 price, and aggregate liquidity. Conditional on the state of
uncertainty (or risk aversion), three variables reinforce one another into a feedback
loop. A growing literature assures that ﬁnancial cycle exists and VIX, a measure of
S&P 500 Option Volatility, works well as a good indicator of this cycle. The ﬁnancial
cycle has a longer time span than the business cycle and the recession after the col-
lapse of ﬁnancial boom seems not only more severe but also sluggish to recover from
it. Minsky illustrates how the unstable nature of ﬁnancial system is developed by
itself. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis state that there are three agents in
the market; Hedger, Speculator and Ponzi investor. While in prolonged good states,
Hedgers are engaged in Speculation or Ponzi scheme, to make matters worse, authori-
ties controlling inﬂation in good state leads their proﬁts to evaporate. In the end, the
asset bubble collapses; Minsky moment. We empirically investigate how the nature
of ﬁnancial stability and instability is revealed in their interplay; among funding con-
straint, market liquidity, and market risk and how its instability mechanism emerge
along with the ﬁnancial cycle.
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Summary
English
Essay 1 : Financial Flexibility and Debt Maturity
We examine how ﬁrms determine their maturity and leverage. Using simultane-
ous equations of maturity and leverage regression, we ﬁnd that (1) ﬁrms with high
volatility of earnings tend to issue short-term debt; and (2) ﬁrms with debt of shorter
maturity tend to have higher leverage. These results imply that a short maturity
beneﬁts a ﬁrm in respect of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility under volatile business environments,
while at the same time the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility contributes to a ﬁrm’s debt capacity.
Our ﬁndings support the dynamic capital structure model in which a ﬁrm simultane-
ously adjusts debt maturity and leverage over the joint space of two trade-oﬀs; one
between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs, and the other between ﬂexibility bene-
ﬁts and issuing costs. And the results rationalize in part the observed capital and
maturity structure of ﬁnancial institutions for the pre-crisis period.
Essay 2: Sharing Downside Risks: Contingent Coupon Bonds
We propose and solve a model of optimal capital structure in which the growth rate
and volatility of the earnings shift between diﬀerent states. We show that a ﬁrm can
enter coupon payment contracts on contingency; paying higher coupon in Good state
and lower in Bad state. We show that this type of security allows for an eﬀective
risk-sharing between a ﬁrm and investors. Our results suggest that contingent coupon
bonds can help a ﬁrm be resilient hit by systemic downside risks.
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Essay 3: Liquidity Spirals over Moving Uncertainty: Evidence from
US Financial Aggregates
We study how the instability of ﬁnancial markets is related to uncertainty. We take
the ﬁnancial aggregate data from US stock markets into a VAR model, allowing un-
certainty to continuously change behind. We ﬁnd that margin requirements, market
liquidity, asset prices all mutually destabilize only in the times of high uncertainty.
Related ﬁndings are that in the times of low uncertainty, (1) margins and market liq-
uidity rather stabilize each other; (2) reinforcement between margins and asset prices
are much delayed in eﬀect; and (3) asset prices and market liquidity react little each
other. In brief, uncertainty ﬂuctuations are crucial to understanding how and when
liquidity spirals turn on and oﬀ in US stock markets.
Danish
Essay 1: Finansiel Fleksibilitet og modenhed
Vi undersøger, hvordan virksomheder bestemmer deres løbetid og gældsgrad. Ved
at bruge simultaneousequations regressions metoden på løbetid og gældsgrad, ﬁnder
vi, at (1) virksomheder med høj volatilitet i indtjeningen foretrækker at udstede ko-
rtfristede gæld; og (2) virksomheder med gæld med kortere løbetid kan tillade sig
selv en højere gældsgrad.Disse resultater indebærer, at kort løbetid på gælden gavner
en virksomhed i formaf ﬁnansiel ﬂeksibilitet i et usikkert erhvervsmiljø, samtidigt
bidrager den ﬁnansielle ﬂeksibilitet til at øge virksomhedens gældskapacitet.Vores
resultater understøtter den dynamiske kapitalstrukturmodel, hvor en virksomhedsi-
multant kan justere gældsgrad ogløbetidmed det formål at optimere inden for ﬂg.
to afvejninger:den første afvejning mellem skattefordele og konkurs omkostninger,
og den anden mellem ﬂeksibilitetsfordele og gældsudstedelsesomkostninger. Resul-
taterne rationaliserer delvistobserverede løbetids- og gældsgradsvalg for de ﬁnansielle
institutioner for perioden før krisen.
Essay 2: Deling negative risici: Betingede kupon-obligationer
Vi foreslår og løser en model for optimal kapitalstruktur, hvor vækstraten og volatiliteten
af indtjeningen skifter mellem forskellige tilstande. Vi viser, at en virksomhed fore-
trækker atindgå betingede kuponbetalingskontrakter baseret på den ukendte tilstand,
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således at den betaler højere kupon i den gode tilstand og lavere kupon i den dårlige
tilstand.Vi viser, at denne type kontrakt giver mulighed for en eﬀektiv risikodeling
mellem virksomheden og densgældshavere.Vores resultater indikerer, at obligationer
med tilstandsafhængige kuponniveauer kan afhjælpe konsekvensen af, at en virk-
somhed bliver ramt af systemiske down-side-risiko.
Essay 3: Likviditet spiraler end Moving Usikkerhed: Beviser fra
amerikanske Financial Aggregates
Vi studerer hvordan ustabilitet på de ﬁnansielle markeder er relateret til usikkerhed.Vi
analyserer de samlede ﬁnansielle data fra amerikanske aktiemarkeder i en VAR model,
som tager højde for at usikkerheden kan ændre sig løbende kontinuerligt i tiden.Vi
ﬁnder, at marginkrav, markedslikviditet og aktiepriser kun kan destabilisere simultant
i tider med stor usikkerhed.Relaterede resultater er, at i tider med lav usikkerhed,(1)
vil marginkrav og markedslikviditet snarere stabilisere hinanden;(2) sammenhængen
mellem marginkrav og aktiepriser er meget forsinkede; og(3) aktiepriser og marked-
slikviditet reagerer kun svagt af hverandre. Kort fortalt, udsving i usikkerheden er
afgørende for at kunne forstå, hvordan og hvornår likviditetsspiraler kan opstå og
forsvinde i amerikanske aktiemarkeder.
10
Chapter 1
Financial Flexibility and Debt
Maturity
We examine how ﬁrms determine their maturity and leverage. Using
simultaneous equations of maturity and leverage regression, we ﬁnd that
(1) ﬁrms with high volatility of earnings tend to issue short-term debt;
and (2) ﬁrms with debt of shorter maturity tend to have higher leverage.
These results imply that a short maturity beneﬁts a ﬁrm in respect of
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility under volatile business environments, while at the same
time the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility contributes to a ﬁrm’s debt capacity. Our
ﬁndings support the dynamic capital structure model in which a ﬁrm
simultaneously adjusts debt maturity and leverage over the joint space
of two trade-oﬀs; one between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs, and
the other between ﬂexibility beneﬁts and issuing costs. And the results
rationalize in part the observed capital and maturity structure of ﬁnancial
institutions for the pre-crisis period.
1.1 Introduction
In the traditional capital structure models, debt maturity is irrelevant as is exoge-
nously speciﬁed whether perpetual or ﬁxed over time (Leland, 1994; Leland and Toft,
1996; Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001). However, these traditional models are of
limited empirical relevance. Not only debt level but also debt maturity moves over
business cycles. The value weighted average of debt maturity across US ﬁrms tends
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to be lengthened in good times and shortened in bad times (Mian and Santos, 2012).
Financial ﬁrms also shorten their loan maturity in market downturns as observed
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis (Gorton, Metrick, and Xie, 2015). Maturity has
even real eﬀects: Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with debt happening to mature in a middle of a
ﬁnancial crisis tend to cut down investment more heavily than others whose debt re-
mains to mature at later dates (Almeida et al., 2009). In this world, a ﬁrm’s decision
of how much levered is not separable from its decision of how long levered.
However, at the beginning, what made debt maturity relevant to corporate ﬁnan-
cial decision? A body of maturity structure models developed over the last decade
stand on one common premise: Firms do value ﬁnancial ﬂexibility or capability to
rebalance their capital structure over time. Provided that the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is
inherent in the reﬁnancing frequency, ﬁrms will ﬁnance themselves short-term debt for
various reasons. For example, they can use it to easily reoptimize their leverage ratio
in response to the changes in market interest rates (Ju and Ou-yang, 2005); to mit-
igate the conﬂict between diﬀerent stakeholders on making new investment (Childs,
Mauer, and Ott, 2005); to prevent the remaining debt-holders from free-riding when
paying back a fraction of the existing debt (Miltersen and Torous, 2007); to auto-
matically reduce debt level when other means of lever-down is more costly (Dangl
and Zechner, 2016); to keep room for choice of default timing on debt (He and Mil-
bradt, 2016); and so on. Despite its popular invokedness in theoretical modelling, the
ﬂexibility argument is rarely examined in data.
The ﬁrst contribution of the present paper lies toward this direction of empirical
analysis. We trace leverage dynamics in data and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with debt of shorter
maturity are much faster in rebalancing their leverage ratios: In terms of time taken
until crossing up/down the initial leverage level after hit by bad/good shocks, ﬁrms
belonging to the shortest-maturity quintile need 1 year whereas those belonging to the
longest-maturity quintile require more than 4 years. The ﬁnancial ﬂexibility works
built in debt maturity.
Securing the evidence for the ﬂexibility-in-maturity, we then move onto compre-
hensive tests of the theory of optimal maturity and capital structure with particular
reference to Miltersen and Torous (2007). Miltersen and Torous (2007) work out a
ﬁrm’s optimal (value-maximizing) maturity structure and leverage ratio as a function
of its earning volatility along with other characteristics constituting the joint space
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of two trade-oﬀs; one between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs, and the other be-
tween ﬂexibility beneﬁts and issuing costs. Although the double trade-oﬀs are found
common among the recent theoretical works, Miltersen and Torous (2007) provide
a clearer framework that straightforwardly facilitates studying ﬁrm heterogeneity in
debt maturity as a function of observable business characteristics.
We carry out cross-sectional analysis with a complete range of US corporate data
from FISD, DealScan, and Compustat. How much levered and how long levered
are endogenously determined upon the two trade-oﬀs. We take into account the
endogeneity problem by setting up simultaneous regression equations for maturity
and leverage with instruments.
We depart from earlier studies by giving the credit to the fact that maturity is
not the only way the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility can embody in. As documented by Roberts
and Suﬁ (2009), 90% of bank loans made to publicly listed US ﬁrms over 1996-2005
have been renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. This implies that where debt
contracts are renegotiable, the ﬂexibility in maturity is replaced with the ﬂexibility
in renegotiability. Similarly, for debts having option-like-features, it will be replaced
with the ﬂexibility in exercisibility. Thus we take into consideration debt character-
istics by groupping into exercisibles (callable, convertible, redeemable bonds etc.),
renegotiables, and straights. Our baseline analysis uses straight public bond data as
is most appropriate for test of Miltersen and Torous (2007)’s theory. In addition, we
use the maturity of incremental debt issues rather than the average maturity of all
liabilities on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet. As robustness exercises to check whether ma-
turity decisions critically depend on its ﬂexibility content, we also repeat the same
ananlysis by diﬀerent debt types and by diﬀerent maturity measures.
Our key ﬁndings include that (a) ﬁrms facing more volatile earnings tend to
issue debt with shorter maturity; (b) ﬁrms with shorter maturity debt tend to lever
themselves up to higher leverage; (c) ﬁrms facing more volatile earnings tend to make
lower leverage; (d) ﬁrms with lower issuance costs tend to issue debt with shorter
maturity. All these results support the theoretical predictions held ceteris paribus in
Miltersen and Torous (2007).
The ﬁrst two results particularly highlight the ﬂexibility-in-maturity and its role
in forming optimal maturity structure and leverage ratio given business environment.
Result (a) makes sense in that intuitively, the value of the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility will be
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more appreciated by ﬁrms operating under more volatile business environment. It is
also consistent with Stohs and Mauer (1996)’s observation that larger and less risky
ﬁrms have longer-term debt while ﬁrms with more earning surprises have more short-
term debt. The cross-sectional result also casts a clear implication on the cyclical
behavior of debt maturity: As demand for the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility increases when
marketwide uncertainty rises, ﬁrms are likely to shorten debt maturity on average
during the times of ﬁnancial turmoil. This is exactly what documented by Mian and
Santos (2012) and Gorton, Metrick, and Xie (2015).
Result (b) is also immediate from the ﬂexibility-in-maturity argument. To the
extent that the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility helps increase ﬁrm value, it can potentially con-
tribute to a ﬁrm’s debt capacity and thus lead to a higher leverage ratio. This may
be because the ﬂexibility enables a ﬁrm to hedge bankruptcy risk in bad states by re-
ducing debt level without interference from various stakeholders of diﬀerent interests
(Miltersen and Torous, 2007; Dangl and Zechner, 2016) and/or to capture more tax
shields by frequent repricing of debt (Childs, Mauer, and Ott, 2005; Ju and Ou-yang,
2005). The result is consistent with Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Billett,
King, and Mauer (2007).
By the other two results, (c) and (d), we also conﬁrm the traditional wisdom
established in the literature with respect to the two theoretical pillars of the dynamic
capital structure models. Result (c), in relation to the ﬁrst trade-oﬀ, indicates that
ﬁrms faced by larger bankruptcy risk take lower leverage while giving up tax ben-
eﬁts. This relation is repeatedly conﬁrmed in the literature (for example, among
some recent works, Johnson, 2003; MacKay, 2003; Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007;
Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010; Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2014).
Result (d) supports the second trade-oﬀ, which holds between ﬂexibility beneﬁts
and issuance costs. Intuitively, high direct issuance costs impede frequent issuing of
bonds and thus ﬁrms subject to higher issuance costs will be likely to issue debt with
longer maturity at the opportunity cost of foregone ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. This result
is in the same line with the early literature on underwriting market (for example,
Melnik and Plaut, 1996; Gande et al., 1997).
Finally, we do robustness checks against the role of ﬂexibility beneﬁts in matu-
rity decisions using diﬀerent types of corporate debt. We ﬁnd that for renegotiable
private credit agreements, maturity and leverage tend to force each other toward the
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same direction. Similar results follow when taking average over all liabilities without
discerning debt types whether exercisible with implicit and explicit option. These
results imply that once ﬂexibility beneﬁts removed from maturity structure and re-
placed by other characteristics, expected transaction costs will take larger weitght in
the second trade-oﬀ and be more likely to lead to some bulkiness in both leverage
and maturity. Therefore, failure to discern and control ﬂexibility content out of debt
types and aggregation methods can potentially mislead one in examining corporate
maturity policy. This is a third contribution the paper adds to the literature as
it helps reconcile a body of previous empirical studies seemingly contradicting one
another.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes data and em-
pirical methods for identiﬁcation and estimation. Section 3 presents the results for
leverage dynamics and cross-sectional variation, and thereby establishes that debt
with short maturity beneﬁts ﬁrms in respect of ﬂexible capital structure and con-
tributes to debt capacity and ﬁrm value. Section 4 and 5 repeat the same analysis
employing diﬀerent samples, ‘contaminated’ in a sense of comprising either renego-
tiable or exercisible debt. Bringing all these results on leverage dynamics (Sections
3.1 & 4.1 & 5.1) and cross-sectional variations (Section 3.2 & 4.2 & 5.2) from diﬀerent
samples, we conclude that maturity and leverage are as cohesively related in data as
they are in theory.
1.2 Empirical Methods
1.2.1 Data and Samples
We construct data set from the Fixed Income Security Data (FISD), Thomson-Reuter
Loan Pricing Corporation Deal Scan (DealScan), and Standard and Poor’s Compustat
(Compustat). We start with bond issuance data drawn from the Mergent FISD,
which covers issue details on publicly oﬀered US corporate bonds, and obtain issuance
information including issuing dates, maturity, oﬀering amount, oﬀering yield, coupon
frequency, coupon type, and other relevant features. We also draw bank loan data
from DealScan, which includes a comprehensive historical information on loan pricing,
contract details, terms and conditions. We obtain balance sheet information from
Compustat North America Fundamental Annual and Quarterly ﬁles.
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We then match the FISD bond issuance data with the Compustat balance sheet
data. We call the merged one “FISD sample”. We also match the DealScan bank
loan data with the Compustat balance sheet data, and call it “DealScan sample”.
Notice that Compustat database contains its own corporate bonds. We thus consider
another sample in which debt maturity and balance sheet information are all drawn
from Compustat alone. We call it “Compustat sample”. We submit each of the three
samples to separate examination for better identiﬁcation. We take “FISD sample”
for our baseline analysis and the other two for further checks.
Our main interest is to see whether ﬁrms behave in data as they do in theory
of the dynamic capital structure model where a ﬁrm simultaneously adjusts debt
maturity and leverage over the joint space of two trade-oﬀs; one between tax beneﬁts
and bankruptcy costs, and the other between ﬂexibility beneﬁts and issuing costs.
However, in practice, maturity is not the only way the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility can embody
in. Where debt contracts are expected to renegotiate, the ﬂexibility in maturity may
be replaced with the ﬂexibility in renegotiability. Where debts have option-like-
features, the ﬂexibility in maturity will be dwarfed by the ﬂexibility in exercisibility.
We have the FISD sample including straight public bonds only, while taking out
callable, convertible, redeemable bonds and as well as private credit agreements.
The DealScan sample consists of bank loans made between ﬁnancial institutions and
publicly listed US ﬁrms. The Compustat sample is a mixed pot of all corporate
liabilities in ﬁrms’ balance sheet. For all these samples, ﬁnancial ﬁrms are excluded
that fall into the standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) codes from 6000 to 6999.
We also require ﬁrms to have at least three years of consecutive observations. We
winsorize the top and bottom 1% in values of each variable to minimize the eﬀect of
outliers. The combined data set covers the period from 1987 through 2010.
We deﬁne variables following the existing literature, as listed and described in
Table1.1. We will provide further details where needed as we proceed. But for now,
it may be noteworthy that maturity measures diﬀer between the samples. As well
claimed by Guedes and Opler (1996), it is better suited for testing of the theory
to examine the maturity of incremental debt issues rather than the maturity of all
liabilities on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet since it is not easy to control all determinants
of debt maturity that may substantially shift. The FISD sample records new bond
issuance. The DealScan sample records bank loan per se. Thus for these two samples,
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we follow Guedes and Opler (1996) and deﬁne maturity as diﬀerence between stated
maturity date and issuance date. For the Compustat sample, we measure a ﬁrm’s
debt maturity by the weighted average of remaining life of all outstanding long-term
debts on its balance sheet.
1.2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Our empirical investigation is carried out with particular reference to Miltersen and
Torous (2007) among the recent developments in the literature. In their theory, debt
of shorter maturity yields ﬂexibility beneﬁts because it can help reduce conﬂicts of
diﬀerent interest between equity-holders and debt-holders. When a ﬁrm’s business
conditions improve, the debt-holders and equity-holders have a common interest in
re-balancing the ﬁrm’s capital structure and creating new debt. In contrast, when
its business conditions worsen, a free-riding of the remaining debt-holders makes it
sub-optimal for equity-holders to reduce the amount of debt by partly paying back
debt. In their model, therefore, the ﬁrm can reduce its outstanding debt only by
issuing ﬁnite maturity debt and waiting for it to mature mechanically. The more of
its debt mature per unit of time, the larger room the ﬁrm secures for new (junior)
debt. For example, even when it has to reduce debt level by 1 unit l in response to a
bad shock, the ﬁrm can issue 1 unit of new debt if 2 units of old (senior) debt were
previously scheduled to be paid back. This ﬂexibility beneﬁts the ﬁrm but comes at
a cost. Debt issuing is costly. Miltersen and Torous (2007) show the existence of an
optimal maturity structure which counterbalances issuing costs as well as tax beneﬁts
and bankruptcy costs.
The model gives dynamic and cross-sectional implications. On dynamic side about
about how ﬁrms should behave over time, the model predicts that ﬁrms who experi-
ence a bad shock to their earnings cannot easily adjust their leverage down to their
new optimal level and will have to wait for their existing debt to mechanically ma-
ture. This re-optimization process will be fast for ﬁrms who have previously chosen a
relatively short maturity structure, whereas it will take long time for those who have
previously chosen a long maturity structure.
To test this dynamic implication, we ﬁrst sort all ﬁrms by their stock returns. This
procedure keeps a roughly equal number of ﬁrms in each quintile, holding calendar
year and the number of ﬁrms constant. We then divide them into ﬁve bins on the
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Table 1.1: Variables: Deﬁnition and Construction
Note: The variables in this table are either drawn or constructed from Compustat, CRSP,
and FISD. The numbers in the parenthesis, (#), correspond to the data item numbers from
the Compustat Annual Industrial ﬁle.
Variable Name Construction
Total Assets AST Assets(6), total book value
Firm Size SIZE AST in logarithm
Preferred Stock PRFS Maximal value out of {Preferred Stock’s Liquidating
Value(10), Redemption Value(56), Carrying Value(130)}
Book Value of Equity EQB AST - Total Liabilities(181) - Deferred Taxes & Tax
Credit(35) - PRFS
Total Debt DEBT Debt in Current Liabilities(34) + Long-Term Debt(9)
Book Leverage LEVB DEBT/AST
Market Value of Equity EQM Stock Price(199)×Common Shares Used to Calculate
Earnings per Share (54)
Market Leverage LEVM DEBT/{DEBT + EQM}
Proﬁtability PROF Operating Income Before Depreciation(13)/AST
Tangibility TAN Net Property, Plant, and Equipment(8)/AST
Market-to-Book MBR {EQM + DEBT + PRFS - Deferred Taxes &Tax
Credit(35)}/AST
Cash Holding CASH Cash and Short-Term Investments(1)/DEBT
Time-to-Maturity MAT Diﬀerence between year in maturity and an oﬀering year
(Both FISD and DealScan sample)
DD3/DLTT MAT A fraction of total long-term debt due in next three
years excluding maturing debt within a year
(DD2(91)+DD3(92)-DD1(44)), scaled by total
long-term debt(DLTT(142)) (Compustat sample)
Gross Spread ISSU Diﬀerence between the prices which issuers receive for their
securities and the prices at which investors pay (FISD
sample)
AllInUndrawn ISSU Sum of commitment and annual fee (DealScan sample)
Equity Return RETN Cumulative monthly stock returns for a year from CRSP
monthly ﬁles
Asset Volatility VOLT Std dev of RETN scaled by EQM/{EQM + Long-Term
Debt(9) + 1/2*Debt in Current Liabilities(34)}
Z-score ZSCO 3.3×(178)/(6) + 1.2×[(4)-(5)]/(6) + (12)/(6) +
0.6×(199)×(25)/[(9)+(34)] + 1.4×(36)/(6)
Z-score Dummy ZSCD Equals 1 if Z-score is greater than 1.81, and 0 otherwise
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basis of debt maturity. In total, we have 25 bins by their performance and debt
maturity in each year from 1987 through 2010. We keep ﬁrms survived for four years
in our sample, since we focus on how a ﬁrm’s leverage has changed by its performance
shock over some periods.
We monitor the dynamics of leverage over four-year time interval, which would tell
the diﬀerence of the interaction between leverage and maturity among various ma-
turity groups. We choose the combination of the worst performers with the shortest
debt maturity in year t = 0 and compare them with the equivalents with the longest
debt maturity in year t = 0 . We keep tracing their leverage between a previous year
and next four years with a negative(positive) shock in year t = 0, thereby observing
a ﬁrm’s dynamic adjustments of capital structure. In the same way, we look at the
dynamics of leverage when a ﬁrm was hit by positive shocks. We compare the best
performers having shortest maturity of debt with the those having longest maturity
of debt.
1.2.3 Cross-sectional Analysis
We test the cross-sectional implications about how diﬀerent ﬁrms choose diﬀerent
optimal maturity structures and leverage ratios. We utilize a range of estimation
models; simple regression, diﬀerence in diﬀerence, and IV regression.
1.2.3.1 Simple Regression and DID
We start with running a simple regression for each of maturity and leverage, sepa-
rately:
MATi,t = αmi + ymt + βmXmi,t + mi,t, (1.1)
LEVMi,t = αli + ylt + βlX li,t + li,t. (1.2)
where αki , k = {m, l}, captures a ﬁrm or industry level ﬁxed eﬀect in maturity
equation (m) and leverage equation (l), respectively; ykt is a year ﬁxed eﬀect in each
equation; and Xki,t is a vector of independent variables.
The independent variables of interests for a maturity equation, Xmi,t, include lever-
age (LEVM), asset volatility (VOLT), and debt issuance costs (ISSU). The indepen-
dent variables of interests for a leverage equation, X li,t, include as maturity (MAT),
19
asset volatility (VOLT), and debt issuance costs (ISSU). We measure VOLT as a lev-
ered historical equity volatility, using information from historical stock returns. We
proxy ISSU using gross spread, which is the diﬀerence between the oﬀered amount
and the proceeds to the issuer as a percentage of the issue size. We take direct is-
suance costs in our analysis, hence the indirect issuance costs, such as rollover costs
and liquidity risks, are not considered in our optimal framework.
We further utilize a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method:
MATi,t = αmi + ymt + βmXmi,t + mi,t , (1.3)
LEVMi,t = αli + ylt + βlX li,t + li,t . (1.4)
This is to control for unobserved variations among ﬁrms. We examine how changes
in leverage and maturity from the end of year t–1 to the end of year t are associated
with changes in independent and control variables.
1.2.3.2 Simultaneous Equations with Instruments
How much levered and how long levered are endogenously determined upon the two
trade-oﬀs. We take into account the endogeneity problem by setting up simultaneous
regression equations for maturity and leverage with instruments. First, we separately
specify two OLS regressions for debt maturity and leverage with instruments, and
then simultaneously estimate the two structural equations by including the predicted
values from the ﬁrst-stage regression as explanatory variables. The 2SLS methodology
accounts for any correlation between the residuals of leverage and the debt maturity
models, which is caused by unobserved inﬂuences on two variables.
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Our two-equation system is speciﬁed as follows:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
MATi,t = αm0 + βm1 VOLTi,t + βm2 LEVMi,t + βm3 ISSUi,t + βm4 SIZEi,t
+βm5 PROFi,t + βm6 TANi,t + βm7 MBRi,t + βm8 CASHi,t
+βm9 TERMi,t + βm10ZSCDi,t + βm11ID.MATi,t + ei,t
LEVMi,t = αl0 + βl1VOLTi,t + βl2MATi,t + βl3SIZEi,t
+βl4PROFi,t + βl5TANi,t + βl6MBRi,t + βl7CASHi,t
+βl8TAXDi,t + βl9ACQDi,t + βl10ID.LEVi,t + ei,t
(1.5)
We rely on earlier empirical studies to guide our selection of instrumental variables
in the simultaneous equations (Johnson, 2003, Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010,
Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell, 2014). The extant capital structure literature ﬁnds that
expected marginal tax rate (TAXD), acquisition dummy (ACQD) and industry lever-
age (ID.LEV) are important determinants of leverage (Barclay, Smith, and Watts,
1995; Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 2003; Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010; Billett,
King, and Mauer, 2007). Nevertheless, those variables do not play any important
role in determining maturity of debt. We conjecture these variables are orthogonal to
the error terms and having zero coeﬃcients in the maturity regression. Furthermore,
term structure (TERM), industry maturity (ID.MAT), and ﬁnancial distress dummy
(ZSCD) are closely related to determine maturity but not leverage. Hence, we treat
these variables as orthogonal to the error terms and having zero coeﬃcients in the
leverage equation.
1.3 Empirical Results
1.3.1 Leverage Dynamics
We investigate the dynamics of capital structure; whether a ﬁrm is optimally adjusting
its dynamics of maturity and leverage to performance shocks over some years. A
ﬁrm would optimally lever itself up once its performance is improved in order to
reach its optimal leverage without conﬂicts between equity-holders and bond holders.
With negative shock, equity holders would like to reduce a ﬁrm’s debt level in order
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of FISD sample
Note: This table presents summary statistics for our ﬁnal FISD bond issuance sample.
Variable No.Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Time-to-Maturity 2345 8.52 7.00 6.05 0.38 22.0
Book Leverage 2345 0.44 0.47 0.34 0.00 0.99
Market Leverage 2345 0.47 0.44 0.21 0.11 0.97
Size 2345 8.54 8.66 1.59 4.60 12.3
Cash Holding 2339 0.08 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.68
Proﬁtability 2331 0.12 0.12 0.07 -0.07 0.34
Market-to-Book 2345 1.09 0.90 0.68 0.35 4.21
Tangibility 2341 0.46 0.45 0.25 0.03 0.91
Asset Volatility 2166 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.37
Return 2345 0.12 0.09 0.47 -0.82 1.88
Z score 2047 2.43 2.18 1.66 -1.01 8.18
Amount of Bond (M) 2345 236.4 185.0 221.5 10.0 1,400.0
Coupon 2345 8.18 7.95 2.26 0.00 15.4
Gross Spread 1996 7.42 6.83 5.27 0.00 34.7
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the dynamics of leverage from t − 1 through t + 4 for ﬁrms from the
lowest performance quintile at t = 0, which are in turn divided into ﬁve cohorts according to
their maturity structure. The two ﬁgures are for those in the shortest vs. longest quintile,
respectively. The thick solid line traces the mean value of leverage ratio for each group. The
shaded area represents 95% conﬁdence interval. The light-grayed horizontal line indicates the
initial ratio of leverage.
Figure 1.1: Leverage Dynamics for For Firms with Lowest Returns at Time Zero
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to manage its bankruptcy probability. However, this is not easy since all beneﬁts
from restructuring go to existing bond holders. The only way is to wait for some
of outstanding debt matured. A ﬁrm having historically issued debts with shorter
maturity can adjust quickly its leverage hit by bad shocks while an equivalent but
with longer maturity would take more time to reduce its debt level.
We select the extreme group in their performance in order to see their distinctive
actions towards adjusting their leverage. With good shocks, we expect the upward
adjustment is prevalent for both long and short maturity group as it is optimal
for ﬁrms with the positive shocks to increase its debt capacity. With bad shocks,
we expect that voluntary debt reductions are more prominent in the shortest debt
maturity group while the longest debt maturity group is slower than its counterparts.
With bad shocks Figure 1.1 shows the average leverage dynamics of the shortest
maturity group adjust after a negative performance shock measured by stock return,
while Figure 1.2 shows the equivalent of the longest maturity group. The thick solid
line traces the mean value of leverage ratio for each group. The shaded area represents
95% conﬁdence interval. The light-grayed horizontal line indicates the initial ratio of
leverage. The leverage in the worst performers in quintile with the shortest maturity
has risen from year t = 0 to year t = 1 after very low equity return in t = 0. This
follows mechanically from the reduction in the denominator of the leverage calculation
(long-term debt + total equity) since the price of equity dropped. However, the
leverage is readjusted quickly between year t = 1 and t = 2 but later on its speed
of reduction gets slower at the end of observation year t = 4. As well as the lowest
performance quintile with the longest maturity group has automatically raised its
leverage ratio since the equity price plummeted. But it has not started to deleverage
much until at t = 3.
With good shocks On the contrary, we examine the highest performance group
with the shortest debt maturity in year t = 0 and compare them with the longest
debt maturity group. We keep tracking their leverage between a previous year t − 1
and next four years t + 4 with a positive shock in year t = 0, thereby observing a
ﬁrm’s dynamic adjustment in its capital structure. Changes in capital structure diﬀer
from the previous analysis; its leverage ratio decreases due to an increase of equity
price at the ﬁrst year. Later, both groups levered themselves up, even though the
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the dynamics of leverage from t − 1 through t + 4 for ﬁrms from the
highest performance quintile at t = 0, which are in turn divided into ﬁve cohorts according
to their maturity structure. The two ﬁgures are for those in the shortest vs. longest quintile,
respectively. The thick solid line traces the mean value of leverage ratio for each group. The
shaded area represents 95% conﬁdence interval. The light-grayed horizontal line indicates the
initial ratio of leverage.
Figure 1.2: Leverage Dynamics for For Firms with Highest Returns at Time Zero
shortest maturity group is faster than the longest maturity one in increasing its debt
level.
In conclusion, the dynamics of leverage shows that a ﬁrm with historically issued
short-term debt had better to readjust its leverage than the equivalent with long-term
debt when it was hit by a negative shock. Our observation conﬁrms that voluntary
debt reduction is possible for ﬁrms with with short-term debt ﬁnancing (Dangl and
Zechner, 2016, Miltersen and Torous, 2007), as well as it reassures an upward adjust-
ment is optimal for both long-term debt issuers and short-term ones with positive
shock (Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001; Ju and Ou-yang, 2005).
1.3.2 Cross-sectional Variation
Table 1.1 provides the deﬁnitions of variables in the regression analysis. Debt matu-
rity is deﬁned as an amount-weighted average of time to maturity at bond issuance.
Leverage is deﬁned as either book leverage or market leverage. Book leverage is de-
ﬁned as total debt (the book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities),
divided by the book value of assets. Market leverage is deﬁned as total debt divided
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by market value of equity plus total debt. We include both of these leverage variables
in all of the empirical analysis for robustness. The independent variables of interest
are following: asset volatility is deﬁned as the standard deviation of equity return
multiplied by market value of equity divided by market value of equity plus total
long-term debt plus half of short-term debt. Size is the log of total assets. Proﬁtabil-
ity is operating income scaled by total assets. Tangibility is net property, plant and
equipment scaled by total assets. Market to Book ratio is market value of equity plus
total debt minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit scaled by total assets.
Simple Regression Table 1.3 reports a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression results. We also employ year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects in order to consider
variations among industry and year speciﬁc observations. Panel (b) of Table 1.3
reports the regression results with year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. As various speci-
ﬁcations of pooled OLSs are made, our empirical ﬁndings have inconclusive results.
First, the negative association between maturity and volatility of asset dynamics in a
pooled OLS equation is insigniﬁcant, moreover the ﬁxed eﬀects regression results pro-
duce an opposite sign. Second, the maturity and leverage are negatively associated in
both regressions, as we predicted. Third, we conﬁrm that the relation between asset
volatility and leverage is inversely related in base regression as well as ones with ﬁxed
eﬀects. Lastly, the issuance costs, proxied by gross spread, have a positive association
with debt maturity though this eﬀect gets weaker in ﬁxed eﬀects regressions.
Diﬀerence method In a maturity equation, our empirical predictions are reas-
sured; a ﬁrm with higher volatility of earnings tends to issue shorter-term bonds
though its statistical power is insigniﬁcant. Second, a ﬁrm with shorter-term bonds
tends to increase debt ﬁnancing. Third, higher issuance costs counter-balance the
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility by letting a ﬁrm start to issue longer maturity bonds. Among
control variables, size, tangibility and cash holding have same signs with results from
a pooled OLS. On the other hand, an increase in strong growth opportunity, mea-
sured as Market-to-Book ratio, has a diﬀerent sign. It is negatively associated with
debt maturity which supports the extant literature; short-term debt mitigates agency
problems (Myers, 1977; Barclay, Smith, and Watts, 1995; Barclay, Marx, and Smith,
2003)
In the leverage equation results presented in Table 1.4, a ﬁrm’s leverage is ex-
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Table 1.3: Results from Pooled OLS Regressions
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for two equations separately. Panel
(a) reports estimation result for the maturity equation results (1.1), and panel (b) for the
leverage equation (1.2). Numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics.
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Maturity
(i) (ii)
Volatility -1.00 (-0.61) 3.47 (1.73)∗
Leverage -2.66(-4.42)∗∗∗ -1.99 (-2.69)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -3.48 (-1.60) -4.57 (-2.04)∗∗
Market-to-Book 0.13 (0.57) 0.60 (2.48)∗∗
Tangibility -0.73 (-1.70)∗ 1.00 (1.38)
Size -0.66 (-9.33)∗∗∗ -0.49 (-6.04)∗∗∗
Cash holding 3.11 (2.47)∗∗ 3.93 (3.13)∗∗∗
Gross Spread 0.09 (4.30)∗∗∗ 0.07 (3.52)∗∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R Squared 0.10 0.29
Obs 1504 1504
(b) Leverage equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(i) (ii)
Volatility -0.37 (-5.59) ∗∗∗ -0.62 (-8.83)∗∗∗
Maturity -0.003 (-3.56) ∗∗∗ -0.003 (-2.69)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.60 (-7.51) ∗∗∗ -0.68 (-8.69)∗∗∗
Market-to-Book -0.12 (-14.3)∗∗∗ -0.09 (-11.3)∗∗∗
Tangibility -0.12 (-7.38) ∗∗∗ -0.07 (-2.82)∗∗∗
Size -0.04 (-14.2) ∗∗∗ -0.04 (-13.1) ∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.32 (6.90)∗∗∗ 0.32 (7.14) ∗∗∗
Gross Spread 0.001 (1.36) 0.001 (1.89)∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R Squared 0.60 0.64
Obs 1504 1504
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plained by asset volatility, maturity and issuance costs with a statistical and econom-
ical signiﬁcance. A ﬁrm with greater asset volatility, higher proﬁtability, stronger
growth opportunities, or higher tangibility tends to lever itself down, while a ﬁrm
with higher cash holdings is likely to lever itself up.
Two-Stage Regression Our ﬁndings from a Pooled OLS regression and diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence method are mixed. The negative relation between volatility and maturity
is statistically weak. Also, those results diﬀer from with or without ﬁxed eﬀects in
both a Pooled OLS and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regression. Corporate ﬁnance liter-
ature has been recognized the simultaneous decision among ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy.
Advanced econometric tools are much used for resolving the endogeneity. In order
to tackle this problem, we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) system of equa-
tions in which the standard errors of the coeﬃcients are adjusted for the clustering
of observations at the ﬁrm level.
Table 1.5 provides 2SLS regression results;panel (a) presents the regression from
debt maturity whereas panel (b) leverage equation. First, a ﬁrm with high uncertainty
on earnings is likely to shorten the maturity of debt. As the uncertainty becomes
higher, a ﬁrm acknowledges the ﬂexible beneﬁts from short-term ﬁnancing. Second,
a ﬁrm with shorter maturity of debt tends to lever up. A ﬁrm with short-term debt
ﬁnancing enjoys its ﬂexibility to manage its leverage, which helps a ﬁrm accommodate
more debt. Third, a ﬁrm with higher issuance costs tends to issue longer debt matu-
rity since expensive issuance costs outweigh the ﬂexibility beneﬁts. This is consistent
with the extant literature on a underwriter compensation and issue costs (Gande
et al., 1997; Melnik and Plaut, 1996). Moreover, the results from leverage regressions
in the lower panel support the negative relationship between maturity, leverage, and
asset volatility. Our 2SLS regression results support our main empirical implications;
a ﬁrm with shorter debt maturity optimally increases its debt, thereby making full use
of the available ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, while a ﬁrm with higher volatility asset dynamics
optimally tends to lever itself down, thereby reducing its ﬁnancial distress.
We also look at whether our ﬁndings from other variables are consistent with
the extant literature. In a maturity equation, size is negatively related with bond
maturity; bigger ﬁrms tend to issue short-term bonds. Guedes and Opler (1996) and
Johnson (2003) suggest ﬁrm size as proxy for credit quality. They elaborate that
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Table 1.4: Regression using Diﬀerence method
This table presents the regression results based on a diﬀerence method. Panel (a) reports es-
timation result for the maturity equation results (1.3), and panel (b) for the leverage equation
(1.4). Numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics.
(a) Maturity diﬀerence equation
Dependent Variable:  Maturity
(i) (ii)
Asset Volatility -0.55 (-0.53) -1.15(-1.05 )
Leverage -1.58 (-1.91)∗ -1.23 (-1.43)
Proﬁtability 3.57 (1.79)∗ 3.40 (1.67)∗
Market-to-Book -0.58 (-2.55)∗∗ -0.48 (-2.08)∗∗
Tangibility 0.31 (0.40) 0.62 (0.79)
Size -0.67 (-5.42) ∗∗∗ -0.72 (-5.63)∗∗∗
Cash holding 1.34 (1.13) 1.10 (0.93)
Gross Spread 0.22 (7.68) ∗∗∗ 0.22 (7.64)∗∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R Squared 0.10 0.17
Obs 1504 1504
(b) Leverage diﬀerence equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(i) (ii)
Asset Volatility -0.10 (-2.76) ∗∗∗ -0.11 (-3.02) ∗∗∗
Maturity -0.002 (-1.91) ∗∗ -0.001(-1.43)
Proﬁtability -0.70 (-10.9 )∗∗∗ -0.72 (-11.2) ∗∗∗
Market-to-Book -0.09 (-12.4)∗∗∗ -0.08 (-11.6)∗∗∗
Tangibility -0.04 (-1.41) ∗∗∗ -0.03 (-1.26)
Size -0.05 (-13.7) ∗∗∗ -0.05 (-13.6) ∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.11 (2.70)∗∗∗ 0.11 (2.87)∗∗∗
Gross Spread 0.003 (2.70) ∗∗∗ 0.002 (2.31)∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R Squared 0.60 0.58
Obs 1504 1504
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Table 1.5: Two Stage Regression
This table presents the results from the two-stage regression of maturity and leverage on the
explanatory variables as speciﬁed in the system of simultaneous equations (1.5). Numbers in
the parenthesis are the t-statistics.
Dependent Variable: Maturity
(I) First (II) Second
Leverage(predicted) -2.44 (-3.56)∗∗
Volatility -0.34 (-5.63)∗∗∗ -3.52 (-1.98)∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.60 (-7.98)∗∗∗ -3.48 (-1.60)
Market-to-Book -0.13 (-17.6)∗∗∗ -0.73 (-1.70)∗
Tangibility -0.10 (-6.95)∗∗∗ 0.13 (0.57)
Size -0.03 (-13.2)∗∗∗ -0.66 (-9.33) ∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.23 (5.41)∗∗∗ 3.11 (2.47) ∗∗
Gross spread 0.0002 (0.32) 0.09 (4.30) ∗∗∗
Tax Credit dummy 0.03 (3.80)∗∗∗
Acquisition dummy 0.02 (2.45)∗∗
Industry Leverage -0.28 (-16.3)∗∗∗
R Squared 0.58 0.10
F-test 172.5 15.87
Obs 1504 1504
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(I) First (II) Second
Maturity(predicted) -0.003 (-3.56)
∗∗∗
Volatility 3.46 (2.36)∗∗ -0.37 (-5.59)
∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -2.80 (-1.56) -0.09 (-9.99)
∗∗∗
Market-to-Book 0.49 (2.79) ∗∗∗ -0.12 (-14.3)
∗∗∗
Tangibility 0.19 (0.57) -0.12 (-7.38)
∗∗∗
Size -0.25 (-4.60)
∗∗∗
-0.04 (-14.2)
∗∗∗
Cash holding 1.69 (1.65) 0.32 (6.90)
∗∗∗
Gross Spread 0.05 (2.87)
∗∗∗
0.001 (1.36)
Industry Maturity 0.93 (28.6)
∗∗∗
Term spread 0.01 (0.09)
Z-score_dummy -0.12 (-0.65)
R Squared 0.41 0.50
F-test 86.97 149.91
Obs 1504 1504
(b) Leverage equation
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higher credit quality ﬁrms are likely to issue both short and long-end of maturity,
while ﬁrms with lower credit quality choose medium maturity. In a leverage equation,
size has a negative coeﬃcient. Our ﬁnding supports that of Childs, Mauer, and Ott
(2005); a proxy of ﬁrm size as default risk, which is inversely related to the leverage
ratio. Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003); Johnson (2003) and MacKay (2003) among
others ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms tend to issue long-term debt with less debt in capital
structure, which is consistent with our ﬁnding.
Our ﬁndings support the beneﬁts of short-term debt in reducing agency problems;
a growth opportunities, measured as Market-to-Book ratio, is negatively associated
with debt maturity. The literature of debt maturity has been focused on agency prob-
lems; Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that equity holders increase investment
risk by asset substitution. Myers (1977); Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980); Stohs
and Mauer (1996) among others, suggest that short-term debt mitigates agency costs
or under-investment problems. Our empirical ﬁnding is consistent with cash holding
eﬀects on maturity and leverage; the debt maturity gets longer as cash holdings in-
crease. Cash is substituted to short-term debt as a mean of ﬂexibility. We also see
the relation between leverage and proﬁtability as well as leverage and tangibility from
leverage regression results. As a ﬁrm becomes more proﬁtable, with higher proportion
of tangible asset, and stronger growth opportunities, a ﬁrm also levers itself down.
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) suppose that ﬁrms with higher proportions of
tangible assets are likely to increase debt ﬁnancing, because such assets can be used
as collateral.
We draw attention on the role of asset volatility on the ﬁnancial policy; matu-
rity and leverage. On one hand, ﬂexibility beneﬁts become more valuable to a ﬁrm
with highly volatile assets, hence a ﬁrm with high volatility of asset tends to issue
shorter-term debt. On the other hand, a ﬁrm with high volatility of assets may has
high bankruptcy probabilities as well; asset volatility is inversely related to the lever-
age. Stohs and Mauer (1996); MacKay (2003); Johnson (2003) also ﬁnd the negative
relation between maturity and volatility. In contrast, Diamond (1992); Guedes and
Opler (1996); Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) predict that the relation is non-linear;
ﬁrms with low volatility tend to issue both short-end and long-end of maturity and
ﬁrms with high volatility tend to issue debt with a middle-term maturity.
We utilize the coeﬃcient estimates of the maturity equation to calculate the ef-
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fect on mean maturity of a one-standard deviation increase in volatility in order to
estimate the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of volatility’s inﬂuence on the debt
maturity. A one-standard deviation increase in volatility shortens debt maturity by
2.5%, reducing bond maturity from its mean of 8.5 years to 8.3 years. The economic
eﬀect of volatility to maturity is rather smaller comparing with other estimates. We
look at how economic eﬀects of other estimates in a maturity equation; a one-standard
deviation increase in leverage decreases debt maturity by 6%, reducing bond maturity
from its mean of 8.5 years to 8 years. Size matters since a one-standard deviation
increase in size(measured as log(total asset)) shortens debt maturity by 11%, reduc-
ing bond maturity from its mean of 8.5 years to 7.4 years. The eﬀect of issuance
costs on debt maturity is economically signiﬁcant; a one-standard deviation increase
in issuance costs (measured as gross spread) increases debt maturity by 6%, length-
ening bond maturity from its mean of 8.5 years to 9.1 years. Next, we examine the
economic eﬀects of leverage equations. First, the eﬀect of volatility to leverage is
economically signiﬁcant; a one-standard deviation increase in volatility decreases its
leverage by 5%, lowering its leverage ratio from its mean of 0.47 to 0.45. Second,
maturity also inﬂuences leverage reduction; a one-standard deviation increase in ma-
turity reduces its leverage by 5%, cutting down its leverage ratio from its mean of
0.47 to 0.45. Size is an important factor for leverage too; a one-standard deviation
increase in size(measured as log(total asset)) decreases its leverage by 14%, reducing
its leverage ratio from its mean of 0.47 to 0.34. Lastly, the economic eﬀect of cash
holding to leverage is substantial as well; a one-standard deviation increase in cash
holding increases its leverage by 16%, boosting its leverage ratio from its mean of
0.47 to 0.53.
1.4 Renegotiability: DealScan Sample
We investigate DealScan data using the maturity of bank loans as a proxy for debt
maturity. Our analysis will illustrate a further evidence on whether diﬀerent types
of debt, for example, public debt vs. private debt, shows distinct implications on
a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy. Thomson-Reuters’ LPC DealScan (DealScan), also known
as Loan Pricing Corporation Deal Scan, provides reliable information on the global
commercial loan market. DealScan database contains a comprehensive historical in-
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formation on loan pricing, contracts details, terms and conditions. DealScan data
are compiled from SEC ﬁlings and public documents (10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks and regis-
tration statements), and loan syndicates as well as other internal sources. We again
explore our empirical implications using bank loan sample. We proxy debt maturity
as time-to-maturity of loan. We expect the interaction among maturity, leverage,
and asset volatility in bank loan might diﬀer from that of bonds. A bank loan has a
higher possibility of renegotiation along the path of performance of ﬁrms. The bank
can closely monitor a ﬁrm’s performance and rearrange its interest rates, maturity,
amount outstanding, and so on during its loan’s lifetime. For example, Roberts and
Suﬁ (2009) ﬁnd that 90% of private credit contracts are renegotiated prior to their
stated maturity.
Table 1.6 provides summary statistics of bank loan sample between 1987 through
2010. The ﬁnal sample consists of 5196 loan observations. Some observations for
other variables are missing. The maturity of bank loans is estimated as 2.56 years.
The average amount of bank loans is 150 million dollars(median) and 299 million
dollars(mean) which indicates the tail distribution of bank loan is positively skewed.
AllInUndrawn spread measures the amount a borrower pays for each dollar available
under a commitment. It adds the commitment and annual fee. Sales is the ﬁnancial
amount by which the company’s revenue is measured.
1.4.1 Leverage Dynamics
We examined how a ﬁrm can adjust downward(upward) when it is hit by nega-
tive(positive) shocks. We also compare ﬁrms with debts of shorter maturity to the
equivalents with debts of longer maturity. Using DealScan sample, we look at whether
private debt maturity reacts to performance shocks in a diﬀerent manner comparing
to public debt. We keep a same procedure in sorting ﬁrms into 25 bins, ﬁrst by
performance and second by maturity following Section 3.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the dynamic leverage reduction from t−1 through t+4 with
the ﬁrms hit by the performance shock in t = 0. Upper panel of Figure 1.3 shows
the leverage dynamics when a ﬁrm was hit by a negative performance shock. The
average leverage has mechanically risen between t = −1 and t = 0, since the value
of equity decreases by a negative shock. The leverage dynamics of bank loan sample
diﬀer from cooperate bond sample; both groups with shorter-term and longer-term
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the dynamics of leverage for ﬁrms diﬀerent in their return performance
at t = 0 and maturity structure of bank loans. The thick solid line traces the mean value
of leverage ratio for each group. The shaded area represents 95% conﬁdence interval. The
light-grayed horizontal line indicates the initial ratio of leverage.
Figure 1.3: Leverage Dynamics: Case of Renegotiable Debt (data: DealScan Bank
Loans)
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of DealScan Sample
This table provides summary statistics of bank loans between 1987 through 20010. The
ﬁnal sample consists of 5196 loan observations. Some observations for other variables are
missing. The maturity of bank loans is measured as amount weighted maturity and the mean
of maturity is 2.56 years. The average amount of bank loans is 150 million dollars(median)
and 299 million dollars(mean), which indicates the tail distribution of bank loan is positively
skewed. AllInUndrawn measures the amount a borrower pays for each dollar available under
a commitment. It adds the commitment and annual fee. Commitment Fee measures the
amount a borrower pays for each dollar available under a commitment. Sales At Close is the
ﬁnancial amount by which the company’s sales revenue is measured as of the closing date of
the agreement
Variables Obs Mean Std Min Max
Loan Maturity 5548 2.56 1.74 0.00 10.0
AllInUnDrawn 4860 36.8 23.2 0.25 283.2
Loan Amt/Sales 3662 0.34 0.70 0.00 21.6
Loan Amt(Million) 5548 396.9 817.6 0.21 22,237.4
Sales(Million) 5042 4,334.3 45,776.2 -4,214.9 1,851,180.0
loan hit by negative shocks increase their leverage automatically at the ﬁrst year.
Group of ﬁrms with shorter-term loan start to decrease their leverage at t = 1 but
recover it at t = 2, while ﬁrms with longer-term loan start to delever at t = 2 and
keep delevering until t = 4.
Lower panel shows the average leverage dynamics due to positive performance
shocks. Firms with the shortest maturity quickly raise their leverage after the positive
shock, while ﬁrms with the longest maturity are slower to increase the leverage. All
ﬁrms behave in a similar pattern; by increasing their leverage after a positive shock.
The upward adjustments hit by positive shocks are observed in both public debt and
private debt.
1.4.2 Cross-sectional Results
Simple Regression We test the four predictions following Section 4 and look at
whether a ﬁrm adjusts its optimal ﬁnancial policy diﬀerently when it is ﬁnanced with
bank loan too. As variables of interests, we proxy debt maturity as loan amount
weighted time-to-maturity, issuance costs as all-in-undrawn spread and leverage as
the fraction of total debt to sum of debt and market value of equity.
Table 1.7 provides the results from OLS regression. In each equation, column
34
Table 1.7: Results from Pooled OLS Regressions: DealScan Sample
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for two equations separately. Panel
(a) reports estimation result for the maturity equation results (1.1) and panel (b) for the
leverage equation (1.2). In each equation, the ﬁrst column (i) shows the results without ﬁxed
eﬀects, and the second column (ii) with both year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Numbers in the
parenthesis are the t-statistics.
Dependent Variable: Loan Maturity
(i) (ii)
Asset Volatility 1.10 (3.59) ∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.50)
Leverage 0.55 (3.40) ∗∗∗ -0.05 (-0.24)
Proﬁtability 0.50 (1.49) 0.71 (1.86)∗
Market-to-Book 0.17 (4.00)∗ 0.03 (0.58)
Tangibility -0.37 (-3.20) ∗∗∗ -0.09 (-0.50)
Size 0.06 (2.70)∗∗∗ 0.10 (4.01) ∗∗∗
Cash Holding 0.01 (0.11) 0.05 (0.69)
Loan amount/sales 0.08 (1.30) 0.09 (1.28)
Issuing costs 0.003 (2.33)∗∗ 0.005 (3.01) ∗∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R squared 0.02 0.22
Obs 2942 2255
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(i) (ii)
Asset Volatility -0.49 (-14.3)∗∗∗ -0.69 (-17.5)∗∗∗
Loan Maturity 0.01 (3.40)∗∗∗ -0.001 (-0.24)
Proﬁtability -0.11 (-2.76) -0.18 (-4.25)∗∗∗
Market-to-Book -0.10 (-21.9)∗∗∗ -0.07 (-14.2)∗∗∗
Tangibility 0.00 (-0.10) 0.02 (1.17)
Size -0.03 (-12.8)∗∗∗ -0.03 (-12.3) ∗∗∗
Cash Holding 0.01 (1.67)∗ 0.00 (-0.14)
Loan amount/Sales 0.03 (4.92)∗∗∗ 0.01 (1.63)
Issuing costs 0.001 (6.50)∗∗∗ 0.001 (6.99)∗∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes
R squared 0.35 0.52
Obs 2932 2255
(b) Leverage equation
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(i) presents the OLS regression results without any ﬁxed eﬀects, while column (ii)
gives OLS results with year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The main dependent variable
is loan maturity in a maturity equation and market leverage in a leverage equation,
respectively. We focus on leverage ratio, maturity, asset volatility, and issuance costs
as independent variables of interests. Other control variables are ﬁrm’s proﬁtability,
tangibility, Market-to-Book ratio, size, loan amount scaled by sales, and cash holdings.
We ﬁnd that the relationship between ﬁnancial policy and asset volatility contradicts
our ﬁndings from FISD data; the higher the asset volatility, the longer the maturity of
loans. The higher fraction of debt to total assets a ﬁrm has, the longer the maturity
of loan it issues. The relation between asset volatility and leverage is consistent with
our ﬁnding from FISD data; the higher the asset volatility, the lower the leverage. It
seems that bank loan achieves the ﬂexibility beneﬁts not from its stated maturity but
from its renegotiation or restructuring. Prior works also conﬁrm that bank loan are
frequently renegotiated (Diamond, 1992; Roberts and Suﬁ, 2009). Results from bank
loan sample support our theoretical propositions; the trade-oﬀ between transaction
costs and the ﬂexibility feature of debt contracts can be oﬀset by the renegotiation
possibility.
Two-Stage Regression In this section, we analyze the joint determination of
debt maturity and leverage using DealScan data. Table 1.8 provides the 2SLS re-
gression results with instrumental variables. Following Section 4, we used industry
maturity, term spread, and acquisition dummy as instruments in the maturity equa-
tion and Altman’s Z Score dummy, tax credit dummy, and industry average leverage
as instrument variables in the leverage equation. The upper panel reports the results
of maturity equation while the lower panel presents ones of leverage equation. We
ﬁnd that the two-stage regression results are consistent with our ﬁndings from a base
regression (see Table 1.7). Firms having debts with long-term loan lever up, while
ﬁrms having high uncertainty on asset dynamics tend to ﬁnance with long-term loan.
These results dispute our ﬁndings from FISD sample regressions. Next, we ﬁnd that
a ﬁrm with high volatility of asset dynamics reduces its leverage, thereby managing
its ﬁnancial distress, which is consistent with FISD sample.
We also utilize the coeﬃcient estimates of the maturity equation to calculate the
eﬀect on mean maturity of a one-standard deviation increase in volatility in order
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Table 1.8: Two Stage Regression: DealScan Sample
This table provides the results when DealScan sample is brought into two-stage regression
with instrumental variables. Panel (a) reports the results when having loan maturity as
dependent variable, and panel (b) reports the results when having leverage as dependent
variable.
Dependent Variable: Loan Maturity
(I) First (II) Second
Leverage(Predicted value) 0.55(3.40)∗∗∗
Volatility -0.45(-14.1)∗∗∗ 1.10 (3.59) ∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.11 (-3.06)∗∗∗ 0.50 (1.49)
Market-to-Book -0.10 (-23.7)∗∗∗ 0.17 (4.00)∗∗∗
Tangibility 0.02 (1.44) -0.37 (-3.20)∗∗∗
Size -0.03 (-13.1)∗∗∗ 0.06 (2.70)∗∗∗
Cash Holding 0.01 (1.35) 0.01 (0.11)
Loan amount/Sales 0.03 (4.56)∗∗∗ 0.08 (1.30)
Issuance costs 0.001 (5.77)∗∗∗ 0.003 (2.33)∗∗
Industry Leverage -0.28 (-20.1)∗∗∗
Tax Credit Dummy 0.02 (2.43)∗∗
Acquisition Dummy -0.02 (-4.01)∗∗∗
R squared 0.02 0.22
Obs 2942 2255
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(I) First (II) Second
Maturity(Predicted value) 0.05 (1.96)∗∗
Volatility 0.21 (0.76) -0.49 (-12.9)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability 0.96 (2.93)∗∗∗ -0.10 (-2.22) ∗∗
Market-to-Book 0.02 (0.46) -0.08 (-17.4)∗∗∗
Tangibility -0.07 (-0.58) 0.01 (0.94)
Size 0.05 (2.47) ∗∗ -0.03 (-10.9)∗∗∗
Cash Holding -0.02 (-0.38) 0.01 (1.48)
Loan amount/Sales 0.05 (0.91) 0.02 (2.81)
Issuance costs 0.003(2.18)∗∗ 0.001 (6.14)∗∗∗
Industry maturity 0.97 (32.1)∗∗∗
Term Spread 0.00 (-0.13)
Z-Score Dummy -0.04 (-0.65)
R Squared 0.37 0.37
Obs 2255 2255
(b) Leverage equation
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to estimate the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of volatility’s inﬂuence on bank
loan maturity. A one-standard deviation increase in volatility lengthens bank loan
maturity by 3%, increasing bank loan maturity from its mean of 2.6 years to 2.7
years. The economic eﬀect of volatility to loan maturity is small since we entangle the
endogeneity between leverage and maturity using two stage regression methods with
instruments. The economic eﬀect of leverage to loan maturity is signiﬁcant; a one-
standard deviation increase in leverage increases loan maturity by 5%, lengthening
loan maturity from its mean of 2.6 years to 2.72 years. We also see the economic
eﬀects of control variables. Size’s economic eﬀect gets much reduced comparing with
bond issuance sample; a one-standard deviation increase in size(measured as log(total
asset)) lengthens bank loan maturity by 4%, increasing loan maturity from its mean of
2.6 years to 2.7 years. The economic eﬀect of issuing costs becomes weaker too; a one-
standard deviation increase in issuance costs (measured as AllInUndrawn) increases
debt maturity by 3%, lengthening bond maturity from its mean of 2.6 years to 2.7
years. Next, we look at the economic eﬀects of leverage equation. First, a one-
standard deviation increase in volatility decreases its leverage by 6%, reducing its
leverage ratio from its mean of 0.47 to 0.44. This result is consistent with bond
issuance sample. The economic eﬀect of loan maturity to leverage is substantially big
in loan sample; a one-standard deviation increase in maturity increases its leverage
by 19%, lengthening its leverage ratio from its mean of 0.47 to 0.56. Finally, size
has a strong economic eﬀect to leverage too; a one-standard deviation increase in
size(measured as log(total asset)) decreases its leverage by 10%, reducing its leverage
ratio from its mean of 0.47 to 0.42.
We analyze the ﬁnancial policy in a dynamic capital structure using DealScan
sample in this section and compare the results with the FISD sample in section
3. We ﬁnd that an endogenous decision between maturity and capital structure in
DealScan sample diﬀers from that in FISD sample. The frequent renegotiation of
loan contracts lets its behavior diﬀer from the ﬁnancial policy analysis with the FISD
sample. Firms ﬁnanced with bank loans can adjust their optimal leverage without
counter-balancing the eﬀects of the ﬂexibility beneﬁts of maturity and the transaction
costs of new issuance. The ﬂexibility beneﬁts using bank loans comes from by means
of renegotiation rather than maturity at issuance. Lastly, a ﬁrm with high asset
volatility levers itself down; this result is very persistent with both FISD and DealScan
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sample. Thus, our empirical ﬁnding supports the classical trade-oﬀ theory, between
tax beneﬁts and ﬁnancial distress. A ﬁrm, regardless of ﬁnance with private or public
debt, manages its capital structure in order to reduce a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress when
the uncertainty of earnings becomes more volatile.
1.5 Exercisibility: Compustat Sample
We compare FISD sample measured maturity as corporate bond’s time-to-maturity
in Section 4 with DealScan sample using bank loan’s maturity in Section 5. Now, we
employ Compustat sample for robustness. Debt maturity from Compustat database
is deﬁned as an aggregated remaining time-to-maturity of long-term debt outstanding
while we proxy maturity as time-to-maturity of bond at the time of issuance using
a new bond issuance data from FISD database. Guedes and Opler (1996) suggest
an incremental approach in estimating the joint decision of ﬁnancial policy whereas
Johnson (2003); Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and others utilize an aggregated
debt maturity. An incremental approach is more suitable when the ﬁnancial policy
quickly adjusts to faster moving state variables at the time of issuance. Whereas
an aggregate one is eﬀective, when its decision on ﬁnancial policy is aﬀected by
slow moving state variables. In prior works using Compustat data, debt maturity is
measured as a fraction of a ﬁrm’s long-term debt maturing in less than or equal to 2
years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years (Barclay, Smith, and Watts, 1995; Johnson, 2003,
Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007). Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) use similar
measures but excludes debt due within a year because a debt matured less than a
year is mainly used to ﬁnance a ﬁrm’s short-term liquidity needs.
We exclude bonds with any optional features in Section 4 since those features
makes maturity of bonds not ﬁxed. For example, a callable bond with 10 years of
maturity at the time of issuance can be called after half of its expected maturity.
Compustat database has a basket of bonds with optional features, whose are not in-
formed. Therefore, we expect Compustat sample has much noise in deﬁning maturity
of debts since it includes all optional features from bonds and summing up all existing
debts a ﬁrm has issued.
Summary Statistics Table 1.9 presents summary statistics for 25,182 ﬁrm-year
observations over 1987 to 2010. We deﬁne a debt maturity as a fraction of total long-
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Table 1.9: Summary Statistics for Compustat Sample
This table presents summary statistics for debt due in next three years(DD2+DD3) exclud-
ing DD1, scaled by total long-term debt(DLTT). We also report similar measures such as
DD1/DLTT (a fraction of long-term debt due in next year) and DD5/DLTT( a fraction of
long-term debt due in next 5 years excluding DD1).
Variable No.Obs Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
DD1/DLTT 25182 0.29 0.05 1.30 0.00 8.58
DD3/DLTT 21775 0.27 0.18 0.28 0.00 1.00
DD5/DLTT 21294 0.51 0.47 0.32 0.00 1.06
Book Lev 27823 0.42 0.45 0.34 0.00 0.98
Market Lev 27823 0.54 0.52 0.21 0.10 0.98
Size 27823 6.54 6.66 2.00 0.00 0.91
Cash Holding 27720 0.16 0.04 0.28 0.00 3.85
Proﬁtability 26236 0.09 0.10 0.10 -0.41 0.36
Market-to-Book 27823 1.05 0.88 0.63 0.19 4.72
Tangibility 26254 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.00 0.91
Asset Volatility 19690 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.82
Z-score 20820 1.98 1.91 1.71 -5.42 7.91
term debt due in next three years excluding maturing debt within a year (DD2+DD3-
DD1), scaled by total long-term debt(DLTT) following Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell
(2014). We also use similar measures such as a fraction of long-term debt due in next
year (DD1/DLTT) and a fraction of long-term debt due in the next 5 years excluding
maturing debt within a year[(DD5-DD1)/DLTT] for robustness. All other variables
are deﬁned in Table 1.1.
1.5.1 Leverage Dynamics
We analyze the leverage dynamics using Compustat data whether short-term ﬁnanc-
ing gives a ﬁrm its ﬂexibility towards an rapid readjustment when a ﬁrm was hit by
negative performance shocks. Using the same methods applied earlier, ﬁrms are ﬁrst
sorted by quin-tiles of performance in each year and sorted by quin-tiles of maturity
from shortest to longest over 1987 to 2010. Upper panel of Figure 1.4 illustrates the
dynamic leverage from t − 1 through t + 4 with the bad shock in t = 0. With a bad
shock at t = 0, the leverage ratio mechanically rises in both the shortest and the
longest maturity group. On one hand, a ﬁrm historically issued the short-term debt
delever itself between t = 1 and t = 2 while a ﬁrm historically issued the long-term
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debt keeps raising its leverage until t = 2. The former lets some debts matured when
it was hit by a negative shock whereas the latter cannot shake oﬀ some debts even
with higher bankruptcy probability, thereby increasing its ﬁnancial distress.
Lower panel of Figure 1.4 illustrates the leverage dynamics from t − 1 through
t + 4 for the ﬁrms in a group with the highest performance shock in t = 0. With the
positive shock at t = 0, the leverage ratio mechanically falls down in both the short
maturity group and the longer maturity one. Both ﬁrms start to increase their debt
level from t = 1, whose tendency continues over the observed years.
1.5.2 Cross-sectional Results
Simple Regression In our maturity equation, we use debt maturity deﬁned as
1-DD3/DLTT as the main dependent variable, where DD3/DLTT is a fraction of
remaining maturity greater than 3 years. Our independent variables of interest are
the leverage ratio and asset volatility. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to proxy a vari-
able measuring cost of issuance from Compustat data. We investigate whether the
alternative proxy of debt maturity aﬀects our empirical analysis. Table 1.10 presents
regression results from the maturity of debt (leverage) is regressed on the determi-
nants of debt maturity (leverage) as well as on the control variables with year, industry
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The regression coeﬃcients on leverage and asset volatility are
statistically diﬀerent from zero with the negative signs, while the coeﬃcient on asset
volatility with year, industry, and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects has an opposite sign. This indi-
cates that, controlling for potential changes in year, industry, and ﬁrm characteristics
over time, asset volatility does not aﬀect in a persistent manner in explaining the
debt maturity. The lower panel reports that the signs of coeﬃcients on the leverage
model are very persistent and statistically signiﬁcant in both a pooled OLS and ﬁxed
eﬀects regression.
Two Stage Regression Table 1.11 provides regression results for the two-stage
regression with instrumental variables. The upper panel shows that the coeﬃcients on
leverage and volatility are statistically signiﬁcant and consistent with respect to the
base regression results. The fraction of debt matured in within 3 years excluding less
than a year, increases along with a ﬁrm’s leverage and asset volatility. The coeﬃcient
on asset volatility is statistically signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcient on leverage not. The
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the dynamics of leverage for ﬁrms diﬀerent in their return performance
at t = 0 and maturity structure of cumulative debt. The thick solid line traces the mean
value of leverage ratio for each group. The shaded area represents 95% conﬁdence interval.
The light-grayed horizontal line indicates the initial ratio of leverage.
Figure 1.4: Leverage Dynamics: Case of Cumulative Debt (data: Compustat)
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Table 1.10: Results from Pooled OLS Regressions: Compustat Sample
This table presents the pooled OLS regression results for two equations separately. Panel (a)
reports estimation result for the maturity equation results (1.1) and panel (b) for the leverage
equation (1.2). In each equation, the ﬁrst column (i) shows the results without ﬁxed eﬀects,
the second column (ii) with year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and the third column (iii) with
ﬁrm, year, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics.
Dependent Variable: 1-DD3/DLTT
(i) (ii) (iii)
Leverage -0.22(-9.02) ∗∗∗ 0.03 (2.02)∗∗ 0.04 (2.27)∗∗
Asset volatility -.058(-0.89) 0.21 (8.15) ∗∗∗ -0.06 (-1.97) ∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.28(-3.60)∗∗∗ -0.07 (-2.46)∗∗ 0.004 (0.11)
Market-to-Book 0.004(0.48) 0.02 (3.76)∗∗∗ 0.02 (3.08)∗∗∗
Tangibility 0.13(7.94) ∗∗∗ -0.08 (-6.30) ∗∗∗ -0.05(-2.11)∗∗
Size -0.02(-6.05) ∗∗∗ -0.04 (-25.7) ∗∗∗ -0.06 (-13.6) ∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.02(0.43) -0.04 (-6.55) ∗∗∗ -0.04 (-4.87) ∗∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed No No Yes
R squared 0.15 0.22 0.58
Obs 20300 20300 20300
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(i) (ii) (iii)
Maturity 0.04 (8.55)∗∗∗ 0.01 (2.02) ∗∗ 0.003 (0.67)
Asset volatility -0.40 (-30.6)∗∗∗ -0.49 (-36.8) ∗∗∗ -0.38 (-27.4) ∗∗∗
Stock Return -0.06 (-24.7) ∗∗∗ -0.05 (-21.3)∗∗∗ -0.05 (-23.6)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.22 (-14.2) ∗∗∗ -0.31 (-21.4) ∗∗∗ -0.36 (-21.2) ∗∗∗
Market-to-Book -0.14 (-69.3) ∗∗ -0.14 (-67.2)∗∗∗ -0.13 (-48.4)∗∗∗
Tangibility -0.07 (-14.6 )∗∗∗ -0.01 (-1.20) 0.05 (4.07)∗∗∗
Size -0.02 (-31.9) ∗∗∗ -0.06 (-27.5) ∗∗∗ -0.02 (-10.2)∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.06 (20.7) ∗∗∗ 0.04 (14.1) ∗∗∗ -0.01 (-2.02)∗∗
Year Fixed No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed No No Yes
R squared 0.45 0.60 0.85
Obs 20300 20300 20300
(b) Leverage equation
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Table 1.11: Two Stage Regression: Compustat Sample
This table presents the results when Compustat sample is brought into the two-stage re-
gression of maturity and leverage on the explanatory variables as speciﬁed in the system of
simultaneous equations (1.5). Numbers in the parenthesis are the t-statistics.
Dependent Variable: 1-DD3/DLTT
(I) First (II) Second
Leverage(Predicted) -0.06(-0.75)
Volatility -0.50 (-42.5)
∗∗∗
-0.21(-4.80)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability -0.33 (-26.7)
∗∗∗
0.07 (1.74)∗
Market-to-Book -0.14 (-80.2) ∗∗∗ -0.02(-1.64)
Tangibility 0.001 (0.22) 0.08(6.25)∗∗∗
Size -0.02 (-32.2)
∗∗∗
0.04(16.5)∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.04 (15.5)
∗∗∗
0.04(6.07) ∗∗∗
Tax Credit Dummy 0.05 (18.9)
∗∗∗
Acquisition Dummy -0.008 (-3.26)
∗∗∗
Industry Leverage -0.18 (-17.3 )
∗∗∗
Year Fixed Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Yes Yes
R Squared 0.53 0.22
F-test 201.8 39.6
Obs 18578 14528
(a) Maturity equation
Dependent Variable: Leverage
(I) First (II) Second
Maturity(Predicted) 0.05 (2.95)∗∗∗
Volatility -0.17 (-7.11)∗∗∗ -0.53 (-40.1)∗∗∗
Proﬁtability 0.13 (4.12)∗∗∗ -0.36 (-27.2)∗∗∗
Market-to-Book -0.02 ( -4.48)∗∗∗ -0.13 (-67.3) ∗∗∗
Tangibility 0.06 ( 4.12) ∗∗∗ -0.002 (-0.31)
Size 0.04 (27.7) ∗∗∗ -0.038 (-34.6)∗∗∗
Cash holding 0.06 (8.60)∗∗∗ 0.01 (3.16) ∗∗∗
Industry Maturity -0.92 (-34.5)∗∗∗
Term spread -0.007(0.00)
Z Score Dummy -0.004(-2.14) ∗∗
Year Fixed Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Yes Yes
R Squared 0.30 0.52
F-test 52.48 157.66
Obs 12252 14286
(b) Leverage equation
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leverage equation results in the the lower panel show that the higher short-term debt
fractions in total long-term debt, the higher leverage ratio. As the asset dynamics of
ﬁrm become more volatile, a ﬁrm levers itself down in order to reduce the probability
of ﬁnancial distress. This is very persistent among diﬀerent samples, supporting a
trade-oﬀ theory of optimal leverage decision.
With the same deﬁnition of debt maturity and leverage speciﬁcations using Com-
pustat data, Johnson (2003) elaborates how short-term debt aﬀects on the leverage
decision. On one hand, short-term debt attenuates under-investment by reducing
agency costs and makes a ﬁrm engage more debt. On the other hand, a ﬁrm, with
a higher proportion of short-term debt, reduces debt outstanding to relieve liquidity
risks. Hence, the net eﬀects of short-term debt on the leverage depend on the counter-
balancing forces of attenuation eﬀects and liquidity risks. Our empirical ﬁnding are
contrasting with Johnson (2003); the net eﬀects of the proportion of short-term debt
to total debt is positive on the explanation on the leverage as well as the ﬂexibility
beneﬁts plus the attenuation of under-investment problems act against the liquid-
ity risk, hence the net eﬀect of short-term debt on leverage is positive. The higher
proportion of short-term to total debt increases the leverage. Childs, Mauer, and
Ott (2005) also ﬁnd that a ﬁrm chooses short-term debt in order to take ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility; short-term debt reduces the agency costs of under- and over-investment.
Nevertheless, they argue that the eﬀect of short-term debt on leverage may not be
positively related, since a ﬁrm’s debt level also depends on the type of growth option.
1.6 Conclusions
We examine how ﬁrms determine their maturity and leverage. We depart from ear-
lier studies by giving the credit to the fact that maturity is not the only way the
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility can embody in. We construct three samples accordingly; sample
having ﬂexibility in debt maturity, sample having ﬂexibility in debt renegotiability,
and sample having ﬂexibility in debt exercisibility. While controlling these features,
our study discovers a clear-cut relationship between maturity, leverage, and volatility
of business environment.
Our new ﬁndings include that (1) ﬁrms with debt of shorter maturity are much
faster in re-balancing their leverage ratios; (2) ﬁrms facing more volatile earnings
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tend to issue debt with shorter maturity; (3) ﬁrms with shorter maturity debt tend
to lever themselves up to higher leverage; (4) ﬁrms facing more volatile earnings tend
to make lower leverage; (5) ﬁrms with lower issuance costs tend to issue debt with
shorter maturity.
With these ﬁndings, this paper contributes to the existing literature in several
aspects. First, this paper conﬁrms the traditional wisdom established in the literature
with respect to the two theoretical pillars of the dynamic capital structure models.
Second, it provides new evidence that where the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is inherently
contained in debt maturity, debt of shorter maturity beneﬁts a ﬁrm in respect of
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility under volatile business environments, while at the same time the
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility contributes to a ﬁrm’s debt capacity. Third, this paper highlights
the importance of discerning ﬂexibility in various forms: A failure to discern and
control ﬂexibility content out of debt types and aggregation methods can potentially
mislead one in examining corporate maturity policy. This helps reconcile a body of
previous empirical studies seemingly contradicting one another.
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Chapter 2
Sharing Downside Risks:
Contingent Coupon Bonds
We propose and solve a model of optimal capital structure in which the
growth rate and volatility of the earnings shift between diﬀerent states.
We show that a ﬁrm can enter coupon payment contracts on contingency;
paying higher coupon in Good state and lower in Bad state. We show
that this type of security allows for an eﬀective risk-sharing between a
ﬁrm and investors. Our results suggest that contingent coupon bonds can
help a ﬁrm be resilient hit by systemic downside risks.
2.1 Introduction
Contingent Capital Bonds(CoCos) are proposed to reinforce the resilience of ﬁ-
nancial system(Barucci and Del Viva (2010); Calomiris and Herring (2011); Flannery
(2014); Albul, Jaﬀee, and Tchistyi (2015)). In times of systemic distress a bank can
not raise an additional equity capital, CoCos can provide it. Yet, CoCos might distort
bank’s ex ante incentives; both asset substitution and debt overhang(Albul, Jaﬀee,
and Tchistyi (2015)). As documented by Avdjiev et al. (2015), CoCos provide capital
buﬀer to banks while the eﬀects on reducing risk-taking incentives is rather weak.
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of issuing bonds with a state-contingent coupon; which
has a similar function with CoCos but is more ﬂexible and weakens stakeholders’
irrational incentives.
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We start by adapting an investment decision model under uncertainty(Dixit and
Pindyck (1994); Hassett and Metcalf (1999)). The literature looks for an investment
timing when the growth rate and the volatility of state variables follow a stochastic
process whereas we focus on capital structure decision following structural model in
corporate ﬁnance. Brennan and Schwartz (1978); Leland (1994) and others consider
debt and equity as contingent claims of ﬁrm value, thus they model and solve the
optimal coupon rate of debt, once a trade-oﬀ between bankruptcy costs and tax
beneﬁts is perfectly balanced. We solve the model of capital structure and ﬁnd the
optimal decision of trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs when a ﬁrm’s
earning process shifts between Good and Bad regimes.
We show that the optimal decision under regime-switching produces a bond with
procyclical contingent coupon rates; this pays out lower rates of coupon in Bad state
while it compensates investors with higher rate in Good state. This feature makes
our proposed security as a risk-sharing security for veriﬁable but excusable economic
events. Our numerical analysis provides the beneﬁts from issuing state-contingent
coupon bonds; a ﬁrm is beneﬁted from tax shields as well it reduces the bankruptcy
probability in bad times by relieving liquidity shortage.
Our paper contributes several strands of literature. First, structural model has
provided a theoretical background on issuing contingent capital (CoCos). In partic-
ular, after the recent 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis, the literature on CoCos shows that
bank issuing contingent capital can enhance its asset value as well as reduce the
bankruptcy thresholds(Barucci and Del Viva (2010); Glasserman and Nouri (2010);
Pennacchi (2010); Albul, Jaﬀee, and Tchistyi (2015)). . Moreover, it persuades reg-
ulators CoCos can be used as a kind of tools to discipline ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Following a classical model of optimal capital structure (Leland (1994); Leland and
Toft (1996)), our model allows regime-switches on macroeconomic conditions, thus
a ﬁrm optimally chooses to issue state-contingent coupon bonds. We provide nu-
merical solutions to show that this hybrid bond can increase ﬁrm value and reduce
the chance of costly bankruptcy by paying out pro-cyclical interests. The state-
contingent coupon rate leads the security to resemble performance sensitive debt obli-
gations whose coupon payments tied to a performance of issuer(Lando and Mortensen
(2005),Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010)), but in an opposite direction. The ﬁrst
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diﬀerence is the conventional performance sensitive debt has a risk-compensating fea-
ture. Otherwise, the holder of a state-contingent coupon bonds shares the risks with
the issuer. Second, the coupon rate of performance sensitive debt is determined
by issuer’s performance, which is a private information. In contrast, our suggested
state-contingent coupon rate is adjusted to the public information triggered by sys-
temic risks. Nonetheless there are few issuance of risk sharing bonds today, whereas
Drelichman and Voth (2015) document that contingent sovereign debts enhance wel-
fare beneﬁts for monarchs as well as bankers in speciﬁed as well as non-contractual
types of contingencies, using archival data.
We propose and solve a model of optimal capital structure under a regime-
switching framework and introduce a new form of hybrid capital as an outcome in
this model. This type of security can alleviate ﬁrms’ liquidity problem in times of
high systemic risks. This security has varying coupon rates depending on the state
of economy; a ﬁrm could lower coupon rates for currently due-interest payments if
the issuer suﬀers large losses from existing investments due to recessionary shocks.
By paying less interests to bondholders in times of low(or negative) cash ﬂow, a ﬁrm
can resolve the liquidity shortage and furthermore mitigate the downward liquidity
spirals among other inter-connected ﬁrms in contracted credit market(Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009)).
Whereas a state-contingent coupon bond shares its characteristics with traditional
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) in several ways. Furthermore, they can relieve
CoCo’s signiﬁcant problems. First, it can resolve the irreversibility or the rigidity
of CoCos. Once the trigger activated, CoCos convert to equity. However, it is very
diﬃcult to reverse from equity to original bonds even if the trigger has nulliﬁed sooner
or later. A state-contingent coupon bond has a ﬂexibility of rebalacing coupon rate
back and forth as systemic risks ﬂuctuate over the ﬁnancial cycle. For example,
the bondholders are paid by lower rates on a predetermined coupon paying date(i.e.,
semi-anuual or annual basis) when its performance hindered by systemic risks. Later,
the contingent coupon rate can be readjusted if the triggers are invalidated before the
next payment date. Second, it can reduce equity-holder’s asset substitution incen-
tives. With CoCos in its debt liability, equity-holders prefer to take a risky project,
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resulting in conversion of CoCos to equity. Nevertheless, a state-contingent coupon
bond cannot eliminate asset substitution motives completely, in this case, equity-
holders would consider the beneﬁts and losses from sharing risks or gambling for a
resurrection.
2.2 Related work
This study is in line with an extant literature studying the optimal capital struc-
ture. Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s capital structure irrelevance proposition intro-
duces capital structure theory in corporate ﬁnance. Assuming no market frictions,
the value of the ﬁrm is irrelevant from sources of ﬁnancing. Followed by Miller (1977),
taxes make an important role of optimal capital structure theory due to tax shields
from debt ﬁnancing. However, there is a trade-oﬀ; the more debt, the higher the cost
of ﬁnancial distress, leading to an optimal level of debt to equity ratio. Brennan and
Schwartz (1978) contribute the theory by providing a quantitative analysis of opti-
mal leverage when an equity-ﬁnanced ﬁrm’s value follows a diﬀusion process. Leland
(1994) extends Brennan and Schwartz (1978) and derives the closed form solutions
for the value of debt and the optimal capital structure.
This paper pursues to enrich to the literature on the optimal capital structure
of a company, issuing contingent capital. Albul, Jaﬀee, and Tchistyi (2015) develop
a closed form solution for CoCos adopting the model by Leland (1994) and Leland
(1994). Barucci and Del Viva (2010) also study the optimal capital structure of a
company issuing callable contingent capital. They show that this type of hybrid
security reduces the spread of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but has
a high spread, which is costly. Their ﬁndings are inconclusive since the ﬁrm with
suﬃciently small amount of CoCos actually increase both the value of ﬁrm and the
equity-holder’s welfare due to tax beneﬁts from CoCos. However, the ﬁrm would not
issue CoCos due to debt overhang problem in case of the leveraged ﬁrm assuming
total amount of debt is ﬁxed. Our study diﬀers from Albul, Jaﬀee, and Tchistyi
(2015) and Barucci and Del Viva (2010) since our model asset dynamics includes
non-stationary components. The systemic risks or macroeconomic risks possess down
a ﬁrm’s earning process, furthermore might exacerbate its uncertainty too. Our model
illustrate how a ﬁrm reacts to abrupt changes of state of economy and manages its
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Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the relation between performance measure and coupon rate. We deﬁne
risk-compensating PSD if coupon rate is a non-increasing and not a constant function on the perfor-
mance measure. On the other hand, we deﬁne risk sharing PSD if coupon rate is a non-decreasing
and not a constant function on the performance measure. Lastly, if coupon rate is a constant function
on the performance measure then this is non-PSD.
Figure 2.1: The Type of Performance Sensitive Debt
optimal capital structure by issuing a hybrid security. The paper that is most closely
related to Pennacchi, Vermaelen, and Wolﬀ (2010); Pennacchi (2010). These authors
also study an optimal capital structure when the dynamics of the state variable make
jumps. One major diﬀerence between the two studies is that we allow a regime-
switching of the growth rate and the volatility of state variables whereas they model
the state variables follow a jump diﬀusion process. Consequently, we show that a
ﬁrm optimally decides to pay state-contingent coupons in this framework. In their
analysis, Pennacchi, Vermaelen, and Wolﬀ (2010); Pennacchi (2010) show that the
bank is likely to increase risks when it issues diﬀerent types of junior debt, such as
contingent capital and subordinated debt, but moral hazard tends to be less when
issuing contingent capital than issuing subordinated debt.
Our proposed security resembles a feature of Performance Sensitive Debt(PSD),
especially a risk sharing PSD. Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010) deﬁne PSD
as risk-compensating if coupon is a non-increasing, not constant function on the
performance measure. Following Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010), we deﬁne
our suggested security as a risk-sharing PSD since its coupon is a non-decreasing, not
constant function on the performance measure. Of course, if a coupon rate is ﬁxed
regardless of the performance measure, this is not PSD at all. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the risk-sharing, risk-compensating, and non-PSD.
The majority of performance sensitive debt contracts is known as ’risk-compensating’,
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such as as step-up bonds(Lando and Mortensen (2005)). The interests of step-up
bonds are linked to credit rating, paying higher interest rates for the event of credit
rating downgrades. In contrast, catastrophe bonds, mainly issued by insurance com-
panies, ensure that coupons are reduced if total losses in the company surpass a pre-
speciﬁed level(Froot (2001); Ibragimov, Jaﬀee, and Walden (2009)). Income bonds
promise the full payment of the face value, but which is only paid if the issuer has
enough income to pay for it1. Income bonds could become an extreme case of risk-
sharing PSD with contingent coupons, in which the reduction in coupon payment goes
to zero at the very severe ﬁnancial distress. Consequently, we analyze the advantage
of varying coupon rates of bonds, not only reducing the bankruptcy probability but
also fully taking tax advantages of debt. This feature is very similar to catastrophe
bonds(CAT) which share a state-contingent nature of an insurance policy. Following
Ibragimov, Jaﬀee, and Walden (2009), two equilibria are possible in catastrophe in-
surance markets; a diversiﬁcation equilibrium and non-diversiﬁcation. In particular, a
non-diversiﬁcation trap is described in which the reinsurance market would not exist
neither insurance be oﬀered at all. The intervention of central agency can correct this
trap. The reasons non-diversiﬁcation traps emerge in catastrophe insurance markets
are similar in TBTF bank cases since the diversiﬁcation of risks is sub-optimal for
the individual insurers(as well as TBTF banks). With the traditional ﬁnance theory,
diversiﬁcation eﬃciently eliminates risks but under some conditions; with the con-
cave utility function (with risk-averse investors), with thin-tailed risks (with normal
distributions) and without market frictions (unlimited liability, no ﬁxed costs, no
government subsidy,.etc). In the absence of these requirements, the investors choose
a sub-optimal solution leading to a socially ineﬃcient solution. Implicit government
protection as well as deposit insurance scheme cause BTF or SIFIs’ moral hazards.
Thus, TBTF are better oﬀ not to insure themselves. Regulatory authorities should
enforce banks to implement CoCos or CAT style bonds in order for them to avoid
non-diversiﬁcation traps.
1 Miller (1977) take income bonds as an example of the full beneﬁt of tax credit without the
bankruptcy cost disadvantages. Nonetheless, Miller puts it “ ....such bonds are rarely issued.”
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2.3 Regime Switching in business cycle
2.3.1 Loss rate on bank loans over business cycle
Figure 2.2 provides some empirical evidence on how the movements of loss rate on
bank loans are subject to macroeconomic status between 1985 and 2013. We use
charge-oﬀ rates (loss rate) on bank loans from Federal Reserve Board. Charge-oﬀs
are the value of loans and leases removed from the books and charged against loss
reserves, the annualized net of recoveries. NBER recession time series are composed of
dummy variables that represent periods of expansion and recession. There are three
NBER recessions between 1985 and 2013;from 1990Q3 to 1991Q1, from 2001Q2 to
2001Q4, and lastly from 2008Q1 and 2009Q2. The shaded areas in the ﬁgure include
three recessions. The ﬁgure (a) presents total loss rates for all bank loans. Next,
we disaggregated total loss rates into three subcategories; Business Loan(b), Credit
Cards(c), and Real Estate Loan(d). There are three spikes in the loss rates coinciding
with NBER Recessions dates. The higher loss rates on business loans are exactly
ﬁtted into the periods of three recessions, too. Nonetheless, the loss rate on real
estate diﬀers a little; it has reacted little in 1990 recessions but a very high spike in
this recent ﬁnancial crisis. Consequently, the historical data for charge-oﬀs in bank
loans shows that loss rates on bank loans are counter-cyclical and coincide with NBER
recession periods.
The ﬁgure 2.2 conﬁrms loss rates on bank loans change dramatically between nor-
mal and stressful times. Fluctuations in real economic parameters will be captured by
the random work. The possible shifts in the behavior of economic time series imply
that constant parameter models might not be plausible for capturing their jump-like
behaviors. Sudden jumps into a recession, which deteriorates the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in a sud-
den manner, cannot be represented by the diﬀusion process. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is a sta-
tionary while the jump between Good and Bad state is a non-stationary phenomenon.
We incorporate this variation adopting regime-switching’ approach. For instance, the
ordinary business of ﬁrm runs in an ordinary manner in Good state, which is modeled
with a diﬀusion process of parameters; μg(drift), σg(volatility) while in Bad state of
economy the parameter values are replaced with μb(drift), σb(volatility). The shifts
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Figure 2.2: The Loss Rate on Bank Loans
Note: This figure shows that charge-off rates (loss rate) on bank loans between1985 - 2013, this
data is from Federal Reserve Board’s web site. We used NBER based Recession Indicators for the
United States from the Period following the Peak through the Trough, from Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. The shaded area indicates NBER recession dates and the straight line is the loss
rate(charge-off rate) annualized for bank loans.
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between regimes are integrated with Poisson jump processes.
Moreover, the regime-switching is important in our analysis to make a distinction
between insolvency and illiquidity. In our analysis, we make use of the coupon pay-
ment to restore the liquidity of banks in a Bad state, leading to a usual operation
without government subsidy. However, if a bank is running badly with high losses
even the business cycle is not in the same regime, signifying that any government
supports for helping survive this bank is not necessary. On one hand, insolvent ﬁ-
nancial institutions are categorized as ’gone-concern’ and they should be intervened
by the regulators for an eﬃcient bankruptcy proposal. On the other hand, illiquid
banks are categorized as ’going-concern’ and the self-revival methods of the coupon
reduction and conversion would help save them.
2.3.2 How do state-contingent coupon bonds work?
Figure 2.3 illustrates both a sample path of cash level of losses from bad lending
activities(left vertical axis) and a sample path of stock market index(right vertical
axis). There are two types of thresholds for adjusting coupon rates; Upward and
Downward. We suggest a more publicly available information as a regime-switching
indicator, such as total stock market index or narrowly ﬁnancial market sector index,
for example, FTSE NASDAQ 500, NASDAQ Financial-100, NASDAQ Bank. A nor-
mal(recession) regime is deﬁned as a ﬁnancial market sector index passes over(under)
the threshold predeﬁned. We only allow to reduce(increase) coupon rates in times
of bad(good) macroeconomic state, or in times of high(low) systemic risks preva-
lent. Reducing(increasing) coupon rate starts if two conditions are met; falling be-
low(above) threshold for bank’s proﬁt level and an index of ﬁnancial market stocks.
By doing so, we adopt a kind of dual trigger as suggested by McDonald (2010);
Pennacchi (2010). The motivation for a dual trigger in our model is to discern an
cash ﬂow insolvency from a default. If ABC bank issuing a state-contingent coupon
is doing badly, but other ﬁnancial industry ﬁrms are not hurt then ABC bank can
not exercise lowering contingent coupons. Instead, ABC bank will follow a liquida-
tion process. With a dual trigger in regime-switching framework, a state-contingent
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Figure 2.3: The Conversion paths and the trigger point
Note: Figure 2 illustrates a sample path of cash level of losses from bad lending
activities. The losses is up and down, in particular, vastly increasing in a period of
recessions. Once the losses or stock market index pass over a threshold , then the
coupon rate get lowered between ts1 and te1 in the ﬁrst recession. After the recession
ends, its coupon rate get adjusted upward until the second recession comes(during
ts2and te2).
coupon bond work like CAT bonds during a crisis period but standard bonds in a
normal time.
How would this security have worked in the Crisis?
We do not know how much we could have reduced interests expenses for debts
in 2007-2009 if we have implemented a state-contingent coupon bond beforehand.
However, we can look at how much interest expenses were paid and how they did
aﬀect to bank’s operation. We analyze the historical data of U.S ﬁnancial industries
between 1970 and 2013. This data comes from the Historical Statistics on Banking
(HSOB) provides annual statistical information on the banking industry beginning
in 1934. The HSOB contains aggregated data from individual ﬁnancial reports ﬁled
by FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions. Figure 2.4 shows how
interest paid to debt has evolved during U.S banking periods between 1970 and 2013.2
The ratio of interest expenses paid to debt to pre-tax income has risen sharply along
NBER recession dates. We ﬁnd that interest expenses become demanding in a bank’s
2 We exclude the ratio of 2008 since the pre-tax income become negative.
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(a) Interests Paid to Debt
Figure 2.4: Interests Paid to Debt
Note: This ﬁgure shows that Interest Expenses FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks
between1934 - 2013 (dollar amounts in thousands), Data is from Table CB06, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
operation in those diﬃcult times. For example, the ratio has been doubled in three
recession periods (1981, 1990, and 2007-2008) while the ratio stayed below 1 or 0.5
in normal times.
2.4 Baseline Model
2.4.1 Structural Model with Regime-Swithcing
We start by modeling the dynamics of a ﬁrm’s assets and compute prices of debt
and equity as contingent claims on ﬁrm value based on Merton (1974); Black and
Cox (1976), and Leland (1994); Leland and Toft (1996). In Merton (1974), the ﬁrm
defaults at the maturity of the debt if its asset value is less than the face value of
the debt. In Black and Cox (1976), bankruptcy occurs when asset value drops to an
exogenous reorganization boundary, and in Leland (1994), the time of default is cho-
sen strategically by shareholders. The Leland type model evaluates ﬁrm’s equity and
debt with an endogenous default boundary in which a ﬁrm’s asset ﬂow follows a stan-
dard Brownian Motion. The dynamic capital structure model successfully applied
to evaluate ﬁxed-income debt securities in recent studies. Nonetheless, there are not
much literature to study the case of regime-switching in dynamic capital structure
model. We also incorporate the regime switching analysis from the investment deci-
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sion under uncertain policy regimes (Hassett and Metcalf (1999); Dixit and Pindyck
(1994); Pindyck (1988)).
2.4.2 Basic Model-Unlevered case
A bank produces a continuous cash ﬂow from their lending activities which follow a
Geometric Brownian motion. In particular, we consider the losses (outﬂow of cash)
from bad lending activities as ξ.
dξt = μξtdt + σξtdWt (2.1)
where the process has the drift of μ and the volatility of σ. Wt is a standard
Wiener process. We begin with a simple model where the drift and volatility of a
recession are increased proportionately by k, a scaling factor, when the regime enters
into a recession from a Good state. Here, we consider there are only two states; Good
and Bad. Let Pg denote total cash (proﬁt) when a Good state is in eﬀect and Pb is
total cash when a Bad state in eﬀect.
Pg = p − ξ (2.2)
Pb = p − kξ (2.3)
where k is the constant, k > 1. p is the interest rate spread between the proﬁt
from lending and the interest pay out to depositors. A bank makse money by borrow-
ing short-term money from depositors and making long-term loans to homeowners,
consumers and businesses. The spread between loan rates and deposit rates is one
way to look at gross proﬁt margins of banks.
The switches between two states are Poisson processes. Let λi, the rate of entering
i and li stand for the time to stay in state i . Starting with a state when a Good state
is in eﬀect, the probability that it will be entered into a Bad state in the next short
interval of time dt is λbdt. On the other hand, when the recession is initially in eﬀect,
the corresponding probability that it will be recovered to a Good state is λgdt. The
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Figure 2.5: Three Regions of Interests
Note: This figure shows three different regions separated by the bankruptcy thresholds of banks with
respect to different states (Good and Bad). In Region 0, all bank are alive irrespective of potential
regime shifts of uncertainty. In Region 1, a bank with high bad loans is bankrupt while the other is
still alive. Finally, in Region 2, since the systemic risks are large, leading to the high losses on loans,
any banks can not sustain its operation any more. All banks are bankrupt.
exponential law holds;
P (li > t) = e−λit. i = G, B (2.4)
Depending on the scale of losses from bad loans, there are three regions of inter-
ests. Over an interval of low values of ξ, say (0,ξ1), any banks will not be bankrupt
irrespective of whether a Good or Bad state is present. Over an interval (ξ1,ξ2), bank
with loss, ξ1, is greater than Bb will be bankrupt if a Bad state is in effect, but if not,
the bank will find it optimal to operate as in a usual manner. Beyond ξ2, the loss of
bad loans will be so large that all banks will be in trouble.
In order to determine thresholds ξ1 and ξ2, we proceed to bank’s earning processes
as a function of the loss process, Vg(ξ) is a value of bank with its bankruptcy threshold
less than positive ξ2 and greater than positive ξ1, and Vb(ξ), a value of bank with its
bankruptcy threshold less than positive ξ1, that is losses from bad lending activities
if the severe recession or crisis is in effect.
Region 0
Consider the first region below ξ1. In this region, both types of banks are alive.
An arbitrage argument leads that
rV (ξ)g,0dt = E(dVg,0) (2.5)
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rV (ξ)b,0dt = E(dVb,0) (2.6)
where r is a risk-free interest rate. Subscript g denotes for a Good state while
subscript b for a Bad state.
Using Ito’s Lemma, we derive a pair of diﬀerential equations
E(dVg,0) =
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
g,0 + μξV
′
g,0 + pξ + λb,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) (2.7)
E(dVb,0) =
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
b,0 + μξV
′
b,0 + pkξ − λg,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) (2.8)
Assume the expected rate of return on asset is r. The equations are rewritten as
rVg,0 =
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
g,0 + μξV
′
g,0 + pξ + λb,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) (2.9)
rVb,0 =
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
b,0 + μξV
′
b,0 + pkξ − λg,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) (2.10)
Hence, the left-hand side reﬂects the required rate of return for holing ﬁrm’s asset
per unit of time. The right-hand side is the expected change in the unlevered ﬁrm
value. These equations are very similar to those expressions derived in standard con-
tingent claims models. Nonetheless, they have an additional term λi (Vj − Vi) which
represents the impact of regime-switching on the value functions. That is, λi (Vj − Vi)
is the multiplication of the instantaneous probability of a regime-switching and the
change in the value function due to a regime shift.
In order to solve these equations, let
Va(ξ) = Vb (ξ) /λg + Vg (ξ) /λb (2.11)
and
Vs (ξ) = Vb (ξ) − Vg (ξ) (2.12)
By making this change of variables, two independent diﬀerential equations are
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derived.
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
a + μξV
′
a − rVa = 0 (2.13)
1
2σ
2ξ2V
′′
s + μξV
′
s − (r + λb + λg)Vs = 0 (2.14)
Each of these equations has a solution of powers of ξ that are the roots of a
characteristic equation provided. In each case we have an interval of ξ that extends
to 0, (0 < ξ <ξ1), so we consider only the positive root. Thus
Va (ξ) = Caξβ(0)1 (2.15)
Vs (ξ) = Dsξβ(2)1 (2.16)
where Ca and Dsare constants to be determined, β (0)1 is the positive root of the
following characteristic equation
Q(0) ≡ 12σ
2β (β − 1) + μβ − r = 0 (2.17)
and β (1)1 and β (1)2 are the roots of the following characteristic equation
Q(1) ≡ 12σ
2β (β − 1) + μβ − (r + λ(t)) = 0 (2.18)
where (t) = g, b.
and β (2)1is the positive root of
Q(2) ≡ 12σ
2β (β − 1) + μβ − (r + λg + λb) = 0 (2.19)
With this notation, we can write down the solutions for Vn and Vr in the range
ξ ∈ (0, ξ1), the region 0, as
Vg,0 (x) =
{
λgλbCaξ
β(0)1 − λbDsξβ(2)1
}
/ (λg + λb) +
p
r
− ξ
r − μ (2.20)
Vb,0 (x) =
{
λgλbCaξ
β(0)1 + λgDsξβ(2)1
}
/ (λg + λb) +
p
r
− kξ
r − μ (2.21)
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the subscript Vg,1 denotes g means a good bank and 1 means the region 1, over
the range (ξ1 < ξ < ξ2). We can deﬁne the same way with Vb,0, b denoting a bad bank
and 0 denoting the region 0 which represents the interval of (0, ξ1).
Region 1
Over the range (ξ1 < ξ < ξ2), a bad bank will be bankrupt while a good bank will
be alive. The arbitrage argument above is implemented for a good bank in a same
way, on the other hand, the value function for a bad bank follows the early deﬁnition
of the value function of bank.
rVg,1 (x) = E(dVb,1) (2.22)
Vb,1 = p − kx (2.23)
By using the no-arbitrage argument similar to Region 0 analysis, we have a diﬀer-
ential equation for a good bank in region 1. Now, we can obtain the general solution
to the diﬀerential equation for the region 1, (ξ1, ξ2),
Vg,1 = B1ξβ(1)1 + B2ξβ(1)2 +
p
r
− ξ
r − μ (2.24)
Region 2
Lastly, beyond the bankruptcy threshold ξ2, (ξ ≥ ξ2), all banks regardless of their
types will be bankrupt and the value of banks is respectively shown as
Vg,2 = p − ξ (2.25)
Vb,2 = p − kξ (2.26)
Thus, we can solve for six unknowns including two threshold values; (ξ1, ξ2) by
utilizing value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions.
Vb(ξ
∗
b , c) = αbVb(ξ
∗
b ) (2.27)
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Vg(ξ
∗
g , c) = αgVg(ξ
∗
g ) (2.28)
lim
ξ↓ξ∗
b
Vg(ξg, c) = lim
ξ↑ξ∗
b
Vg(ξg, c) (2.29)
lim
ξ↓ξ∗
b
V
′
g (ξg, c) = lim
ξ↑ξ∗
b
V
′
g (ξg, c) (2.30)
First, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions should be satisﬁed for Vb,1
and Vg,2 equations. Also for Vb,1 and Vg,2 the function has to be continuously diﬀer-
ential across it and two equation should have equal values and derivatives there. In
all we have six equations to determine the thresholds, ξ1,ξ2 and the four constants
B1, B2, Ca, Cs.
2.4.3 Numerical Solution
Proposition 2.1. In un-levered case, the regime-switching model characterizes the
higher ﬁrm value as well as higher bankruptcy thresholds in Good state than Bad
state.
We illustrate Proposition 1 with a numerical solution. Take r = 0.05, σ = 0.2,
μ = 0.02, λg = 0.1, λb = 0.1, p = 2, k = 2, which parameters are following Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). With these parameters given, the thresholds for a good and
Bad states are receptively ξ1 = 1.63 and ξ2 = 3.26. Next, we compute comparative
statistics by varying volatility and level of cash ﬂow and risk-free rate. The ﬁrst
ﬁgure shows that a bank in a Good state has a higher value and higher bankruptcy
threshold comparing to a bank in a Bad state as the loss on bad loan increases.
The second graph illustrates changes in volatility have a positive relation with the
bankruptcy threshold. However, the last ﬁgure represents the risk free interest rates
inﬂuences on the bankruptcy thresholds in an opposite direction. All results conﬁrm
the traditional capital structure theory also works in a regime-switching framework.
We represent the fundamental treatment of solving the structural capital struc-
ture model with a regime switching element in this section. Also we illustrate the
relationship between the value of banks in diﬀerent regime and the bankruptcy thresh-
old, the positive correlation of volatility and bankruptcy threshold and the negative
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(a) Firm Value changes (b)Bankruptcy boundary changes
as cash ﬂow changes as volatility changes
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as risk free rate changes
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Figure 2.6: Comparative statistics of unlevered Case
Note: Figure (a) shows that bank in a Good state have a higher value and higher bankruptcy
threshold comparing to a bank in a Bad state as the loss on bad loan increases. Figure (b) illustrates
the change in volatility has a positive relation with the bankruptcy threshold. However, Figure (c)
points out the risk free interest rates inﬂuences on the bankruptcy thresholds in a negative direction.
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correlation of risk free rate and bankruptcy threshold which are line with an extant
credit risk literature(Brennan and Schwartz (1978); Leland (1994); Leland and Toft
(1996)).
2.5 Levered Case
Next, we consider a levered bank. For simplicity, we assume a bank issues one type
of bonds with contingent coupons and equity in its capital structure (it does issue no
other types of bonds). Using the results from Section 4 of Un-levered Case, we can
obtain both debt and equity value of levered banks.
Region 0
We assume a simple tax structure; corporate proﬁts are taxed at τc, eﬀective dividends
are taxed at τd, and interest payment to investors are taxed at a personal rate τi.. The
eﬀective tax rate is (1 − τe) = (1 − τd) (1 − τc). In general, any claim must satisfy
the partial diﬀerential equation (PDE) and we derive a pair of partial diﬀerential
equations (PDEs) for each regime.
0 = 12σ
2ξ2V
′′
g,0 + μξV
′
g,0 + λb,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) − rVg,0 + c (2.31)
0 = 12σ
2ξ2V
′′
b,0 + μξV
′
b,0 − λg,0 (Vb,0 − Vg,0) − rVb,0 + c (2.32)
where c is the payout ﬂow (coupon payment ﬂow to debt-holders). Solving these
PDEs, we have a couple of debt and equity value for each regime case. First, for the
region 0 (where both banks are alive), EG0(ξ) is deﬁned as the value of equity for
the bank in Good state and DG0(ξ) the value of debt for the bank in a Good state,
in a similar way, EB(ξ) the value of equity for a Bad state and DB(ξ) the value of
debt which Bad state is in eﬀect.
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EG0(ξ) =
(
λg,0λb,0eg01ξ
x1 − λbeg02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0) − eg03ξ(2.33)
+ (1 − τe)(p − c)/r
DG0(ξ) = (λg,0λb,0 dg01ξx1 − λb,0dg02ξy1)/ (λg,0 + λb,0) + (1 − τi) c/r (2.34)
EB0(ξ) =
(
λg,0λb,0eb01ξ
x1 + λg,0eb02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0) + eb03ξ (2.35)
+ (1 − τe)(p − c)/r
DB0(ξ) =
(
λg,0λb,0db01ξ
x1 + λg,0db02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0) + (1 − τi) c/r (2.36)
where the power x1 stands for β (0)1 ,and y1 for β (2)1 , z1 for β (1)1 and z2 for
β (1)2 . Here, we change the notation for the simplicity.
Region 1
For the region 1, let EG1(ξ) and DG1(ξ) denote the value of debt and equity for in
a Good state. Over the region 1, while the bank survives in a Good state, the bank
in a Bad state is bankrupt. The solution for the ordinary diﬀerential equations only
remains for the bank in a Good state. The equations represent the debt and equity
values for a bank in a Good state.
EG1(ξ) = eg11ξz1 + eg12ξz2 − (1 − τe) ξ/ (r + λb,1 − μ) (2.37)
+ (1 − τe)(p − c)/ (r + λb,1)
DG1(ξ) = dg11ξz1 + dg12ξz2 + (1 − τi) c/ (r + λb,1) (2.38)
For the region 1, the bank in a Bad state is bankrupt. Thus, Vb,1(ξ) and DB1(ξ)
stand for the value of ﬁrm and debt in a Bad state while the equity denoted by
EB1(ξ) becomes worthless.
Vb,1(ξ) = p − kξ (2.39)
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DB1(ξ) = (1 − α)Vb,1(ξ) (2.40)
EB1(ξ) = 0 (2.41)
Region 2
Lastly, beyond the bankruptcy threshold ξ2, (ξ ≥ ξ2), all banks under both regimes
will be bankrupt and the value of banks is respectively shown as
Vg,2(ξ) = p − ξ (2.42)
Vb,2(ξ) = p − kξ (2.43)
Following the argument from Leland (1994), let VB be the level of bank’s asset at
which bankruptcy occurs, and if bankruptcy declares, a fraction of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 value
will be lost as bankruptcy costs. Thus, debt-holders will have the remaining value
of ﬁrm and the equity holders get nothing. This boundary condition applies that at
V = Vl(ξl), DGl(ξl) = (1−α)V g,l(ξl), DBl(ξl) = (1−α)Vb,l(ξl). Let call ξl, l = 1, 2 as
the bankruptcy threshold from Section 1 and 2. That is, the value of debt is same as
un-levered case(all equity ﬁnanced case) multiplied by (1−α), the remaining fraction
of total ﬁrm value, as the bank is approaching to the bankruptcy thresholds.
2.5.1 The Value of Debt
Proposition 2.2. When the ﬁrm’s loss process is given by 2.5 and it has issued
Risk-Sharing Bond with Contingent Coupon with varying coupon payment c, and let
G and B denote Good and Bad state of economy, the value of corporate debt in region
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l = 0, 1, 2 in three diﬀerent regions is given by
DGl
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
= (λg,0λb,0 dg01ξx1 − λb,0dg02ξy1)/ (λg,0 + λb,0)
+ (1 − τi) c/r, (l = 0, ξ ≤ ξ1)
= dg11ξz1 + dg12ξz2 + (1 − τi) c/ (r + λb,1) , (i = 1, ξ1 < ξ ≤ ξ2)
= (1 − α)Vg,2(ξ), (l = 2, ξ > ξ2)
(2.44)
DBl
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
=
(
λg,0λb,0db01ξ
x1 + λg,0db02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0)
+ (1 − τi) c/r , (l = 0, ξ ≤ ξ1)
= (1 − α)Vb,l(ξ) , (l = 1, 2 ξ > ξ1)
(2.45)
2.5.2 Equity Value and Default policy
We derive the value of equity following a similar process from Proposition 2.
Proposition 2.3. When the ﬁrm’s loss process is given by 2.5 and it has issued Risk-
Sharing Bond with Contingent Coupon with varying coupon payment c, and let G and
B denote Good and Bad state of economy, the value of equity in region l = 0, 1, 2 in
three diﬀerent regions is given by
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EGl
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
=
(
λg,0λb,0eg01ξ
x1 − λb,0eg02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0) − eg03ξ
+(1 − τe)(p − c)/r , (l = 0, ξ ≤ ξ1)
= eg11ξz1 + eg12ξz2 − (1 − τe) ξ/ (r + λb,1 − μ)
+1 − τe)(p − c)/ (r + λb) , (l = 1 ξ1 < ξ ≤ ξ2)
= 0 , (l = 2 ξ > ξ2)
(2.46)
EBl
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
=
(
λg,0λb,0eb01ξ
x1 + λg,0eb02ξy1
)
/ (λg,0 + λb,0) + eb03ξ
+(1 − τe)(p − c)/r , (l = 0 ξ ≤ ξ1)
= 0 , (l = 1, 2, ξ > ξ1)
(2.47)
Following contingent claims model(Leland and Toft (1996); Hackbarth, Miao, and
Morellec (2006); Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007)), a shareholder’s objective
is to maximize their equity value and default policy is determined by a shareholder’s
optimal decision not to inject funds in the ﬁrm. Thus, the following two boundary
conditions are satisﬁed:
EG
′
i (ξ∗) = 0
EB
′
i (ξ∗) = 0
The smooth-pasting conditions provide that defaults happen along the optimal path
by requiring a continuity of the slopes at the endogenous default thresholds ξ∗1 andξ∗2 .
2.6 Numerical Results
Following Section 4.3, wee compute an optimal leverage, optimal coupons, credit
spreads and bankruptcy boundaries for levered case analysis. We also provide com-
parative statistics in Good vs Bad state as the key parameter values vary at certain
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interval. We take standard parameter values following Dixit and Pindyck (1994);
Leland (1994); Hassett and Metcalf (1999) and compare Chen (2010) which has nine
discrete states.
Proposition 2.4. The Regime Switching model characterizes that a coupon rate drops
to a lower level as the economic state transits from a Good state to a Bad state. In
contrast, it jumps up a higher level when the economic state switches from a Bad state
to a Good one.
First, we solve how optimal coupons are varying in two extreme states according
to changes in the volatility of underlying process. The numerical analysis conﬁrms
that the optimal coupon jumps down to a lower level from Good state to Bad state
as our theory predicted. As the volatility of cash ﬂow ( σb) increases between 0.05 to
0.45, the optimal coupon diﬀerence between Good state and Bad state is increasing
from 0 to 0.6. On the other hand, the diﬀerence is decreasing but still positive as the
volatility of cash ﬂow( σg) changes.
Proposition 2.5. The Regime Switching model characterizes a counter-cyclical lever-
age over the business cycle.
Next, we show how a bank decides its leverage in times of uncertain regime-shifts.
We deﬁne an optimal leverage as (D/D + E). The numerical analysis provides that
a bank takes more debt when the volatility of earning is high in Bad state. The
average leverage in Bad state is higher than Good state since hiring more debt in
Bad state produces higher tax beneﬁts at ﬁrst and lower coupon payments at later.
The optimal leverage gets lower in Good state while its leverage is ﬁxed in Bad state
as the volatility of cash ﬂow in Good state ( σg) increases between 0.05 to 0.40. The
optimal leverage of bank in Bad state does not change from its optimal level of 0.83
when the volatility of cash ﬂow in Good state varies between 0.05 and 0.40. On the
other hand, a bank in Good state takes less and less debts as the uncertainty of cash
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(a)Optimal coupon diﬀerence changes
as volatility changes
Figure 2.7: The Optimal Coupon Diﬀerence
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the optimal coupon diﬀerence between Good state and Bad state as the
volatility varies between 0.05 to 0.40 with the standard parameter values, rg = 0.05, rb = 0.05, σg =
0.1, σb = 0.4, μg = 0.01, μb = −0.04, λg = 0.1, λb = 0.1, pg = 2, pb = 1, τi = 0.3, τe = 0.3. The
ﬁgure shows that an optimal coupon diﬀerence from Good state to Bad state is positive and upward
sloping as the volatility of earnings in Bad state increases from 0.05 and to 0.40. On the other hand,
the diﬀerence is still positive but decreasing as the volatility of earnings in Good state increases from
0.05 and to 0.40.
ﬂow increases. The optimal leverage plummets from 0.98 to 0.60 when cash ﬂow
streams get more volatile from 0.05 to 0.40.
The second ﬁgure shows the optimal leverage when the volatility of cash ﬂow in
Bad state varies between 0.05 and 0.40. The leverage in Bad state is not changing
much while a bank is taking more debt in Good state if the earning prospects are
uncertain in Bad state. This ﬁgure provides intuitive results about the bank’s ﬁnanc-
ing policy issuing contingent coupons in case of regime changes. A bank’s optimal
leverage is counter-cyclical in Good state even though a bank forecasts the economic
uncertainty might be very volatile. In contrast, a bank keeps a high level of leverage
when a bank runs its business for long periods of Bad state regardless of the level
of uncertainty in the economy. The decision to how much a bank issues external
debts depends on the economic uncertainty in a good or Bad state (where a bank
is operating at the moment) as well as its unknown but expected state. A bank
keeps deleveraging when it is normally operated but the earning prospects get more
uncertain. On the other hand, it keeps taking more debt if it expects a Bad state
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Leverage as volatility changes Leverage as volatility changes
(a) Good state (b) Bad state
Figure 2.8: The Optimal Leverage
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the optimal leverage in Good state vs Bad state as the volatility varies
between 0.05 to 0.40 with the standard parameter values, rg = 0.05, rb = 0.05, σg = 0.1, σb =
0.4, μg = 0.01, μb = −0.04, λg = 0.1, λb = 0.1, pg = 2, pb = 1, τi = 0.3, τe = 0.3. The ﬁgure shows
that a bank keeps de-leveraging in Good state, while its ﬁnancing decision is not aﬀected in Bad
state, as the volatility of earnings in Good state increases from 0.05 and to 0.40. On the other hand,
a bank is aggressive in taking more debt in Good state while a bank’s leverage is not varying much
as the volatility of earnings in Bad state increases from 0.05 and to 0.40.
with high volatility of earnings. Nonetheless, the optimal leverage in Bad state keeps
staying at very high when it is operated in a Bad state at present and its income
process get more uncertain. Also, its optimal leverage would not change much when
it expects its earning process becomes more uncertain even if its economic status
switches from its current recessionary state to a Good state. Financial regulatory
agencies should guide a bank to lever itself down when credit is abundant and to
lever itself up when credit gets scarce. Equity holders have an incentive to increase
risk when it sees a call option like feature of compensation in times of credit expansion
(asset substitution). In contrasts, they have a disinvestment incentive even though
a positive NPV project is available in times of credit contraction (debt overhang).
Berg and Kaserer (2010) study that a certain types of Coco bonds exaggerate both
the asset substitution and debt overhang problem. Our ﬁnding, a counter-cyclical
leverage, helps prevent destabilizing eﬀects from transferring wealth between equity
holders and bond holders.
Proposition 2.6. The Regime Switching model characterizes counter-cyclical default
boundaries over the business cycle.
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Bankruptcy boundary as volatility changes Bankruptcy boundary as volatility changes
(a) Good state (b) Bad state
Figure 2.9: The Default boundaries for ﬁrms with state-contingent coupon bonds
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates default boundaries in Good state vs Bad state as the volatility varies
between 0.05 to 0.45 with the standard parameter values, rg = 0.05, rb = 0.05, σg = 0.1, σb =
0.4, μg = 0.01, μb = −0.04, λg = 0.1, λb = 0.1, pg = 2, pb = 1, τi = 0.3, τe = 0.3. The ﬁgure
shows that default boundaries increase with volatility of cash ﬂow in its own state, while its default
boundaries decrease(or does not change) with volatility of earnings in another state.
The default boundary increases with the volatility of earnings in its own state and
decreases or does not change much with the current or expected volatility of earnings
in other state. Merton (1974) expresses the decision to default as exercising a put
option. A ﬁrm chooses higher default boundaries when its volatility of earnings gets
higher since a value of put option increases with the volatility of underlying assets;
a value of ﬁrm. Equity holders trade-oﬀ between retaining put option and paying
interests, and giving up their rights and not paying interests any more until upon its
default.
Proposition 2.7. (Credit Spreads) The Regime Switching model characterizes a
counter-cyclical credit spreads over the business cycle.
Credit spreads are measured as yields diﬀerence between corporate bonds and
risk free debt (U.S Treasuries). In dynamic capital structure theory, credit spreads
calibrated have been lower and less volatile than observed one, which is called credit
spread puzzle. In our numerical analysis, average credit spreads are higher than Chen
(2010)’s nine state model3. This ﬁgure illustrates how credit spreads change in Good
3Chen(2010) estimates the 10-year credit spread ranges between 37 bps and 101 bps, which he
recognizes it is far short of the spread in the data (148 bps).
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Credit spreads as volatility changes Credit spreads as volatility changes
(a) Good state (b) Bad state
Figure 2.10: Credit Spreads for ﬁrms with state-contingent coupon bonds
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates how credit spreads change in Good state vs Bad state as the volatility of
earnings varies between 0.05 to 0.40 with the standard parameter values, rg = 0.05, rb = 0.05, σg =
0.1, σb = 0.4, μg = 0.01, μb = −0.04, λg = 0.1, λb = 0.1, pg = 2, pb = 1, τi = 0.3, τe = 0.3. The
ﬁgure shows that credit spreads decrease from 5 percent to 2 percent in a Good state as the economic
uncertainty get bigger . On the other hand, credit spreads in a Bad state increases from 1.5 percent
to 11 percent as the economic uncertainty increases.
vs a Bad state as the volatility of cash ﬂow varies between 0.05 to 0.40. The ﬁgure
shows that credit spreads decrease from 450 bps to 180 bps in a Good state as the
uncertainty of future earnings get larger. Average credit spreads in a Good state
is very close to the observed one from data, 148 bps(Chen (2010)). On the other
hand, credit spreads in Bad state increases from 1,500 percent to 11,000 bps as the
uncertainty of future earnings increases from 0.05 to 0.40. The extremely high credit
spreads (11 percent) measured in Bad state are exactly ﬁtted into the empirical data;
U.S High Yield BB Spread4 reached as high as 14 percent in November 2008 and kept
above 10 percent throughout 2008 and 2009 in the recent ﬁnancial crisis(see ??)
4 This data represents the Option-Adjusted Spread (OAS) of the BofA Merrill Lynch US Cor-
porate BB Index, a subset of the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II Index tracking
the performance of US dollar denominated below investment grade rated corporate debt pub-
lically issued in the US domestic market. This subset includes all securities with a given in-
vestment grade rating BB. Data is retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BAMLH0A1HYBB/
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2.7 Summary and Conclusions
We model a ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure when a growth rate and volatility of
earnings shift between Good and Bad state. A ﬁrm optimally issues a security
with state-contingent coupon obligations. We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, a ﬁrm issuing state-
contingent coupon bonds, which pay out higher coupons in Good state while reduce
its coupon rate in Bad state, eﬃciently manages its liquidity shortage in times of high
systemic risks. Second, a ﬁrm optimally adjusts its leverage in a counter-cyclical way
over the business cycle. This helps to stabilize asset substitution eﬀects in times
of credit expansion (Good state) while it also discourage a bank owner’s disinvest-
ment incentives in times of credit contraction (Bad state). Finally, we also contribute
to explain why dynamic capital structure model can not produce reasonable credit
spreads. Our proposed security modeled under uncertain regime changes achieve ex-
tremely high credit spreads (11 percent) measured in Bad state which are well-ﬁtted
into the empirical data; U.S High Yield BB Spread5 reached as high as 14 percent in
November 2008 and kept above 10 percent throughout 2008 and 2009 in the recent
ﬁnancial crisis. This study suggests a macro-prudential policy to regulatory agencies,
by partly replacing CoCo bonds to state-contingent coupon bonds. CoCos are en-
couraged to be issued as recapitalization eﬀorts for a bank when its capital cushion
needs. However, CoCos have some limitations; ﬁrst, they have a irreversibility from
converting bonds to equities. Second, they might exacerbate both the asset substitu-
tion and debt overhang problem. Our suggested bonds with state-contingent coupons
can mitigate CoCos’ limitations 1) state-contingent coupons are more ﬂexible than
conversion from bond to equity. 2) a bank issuing state-contingent coupon bonds op-
timally has a counter-cyclical leverage ratio since this type of contingent bonds helps
5 This data represents the Option-Adjusted Spread (OAS) of the BofA Merrill Lynch US Cor-
porate BB Index, a subset of the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II Index tracking
the performance of US dollar denominated below investment grade rated corporate debt pub-
lically issued in the US domestic market. This subset includes all securities with a given in-
vestment grade rating BB. Data is retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BAMLH0A1HYBB/
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mitigate equity-holders’ incentive to take risks in Good state while it encourages them
to take a positive NPV projects in Bad state.
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Appendix
Generalized model
1. Un-Levered Case
We also consider the loss process has diﬀerent drifts and volatility respectively diﬀer-
ent regimes (Normal, Recession).
dξt = μ(t)ξtdt + σ(t)ξtdWt (2.48)
where the process has the drift of μ and the volatility of σ. The (t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}
is a ﬁnite-state continuous time Markov chain and Wt is a standard Wiener process.
Here, we assume that W (t) and (t) are independent. We consider the loss process
has diﬀerent drifts and volatility respectively diﬀerent regimes (Normal, Recession).
We start this analysis of an un-levered bank for its simplicity and obtain the closed
solutions for the value of bank. Later, we will use this result for the levered banks
which we are more interested in.
dξt = μrξtdt + σrξtdWt (2.49)
dξt = μnξtdt + σnξtdWt (2.50)
where (t) = r, n. The corresponding value of bank (proﬁt) is now deﬁned by
Pr = Pn = p − ξ (2.51)
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Region 0
For the interval of 0 < ξ < ξ1, the corresponding diﬀerential equations are given by
E(dVn) =
1
2σ
2
nξ
2V
′′
n + μnξV
′
n + λr (Vr − Vn) (2.52)
E(dVr) =
1
2σ
2
rξ
2V
′′
r + μrξV
′
r − λn (Vr − Vn) (2.53)
and for ξ ∈ [ξ2,∞], Vr = Vn = p − ξ.
Using the two diﬀerential equations, we solve Vr as a function of Vn and substi-
tuting it into the other equation which leads to a fourth-order diﬀerential equation.
1
4σ
2
nσ
2
rV
′′′′
n +
1
2(σ
2
nμr + σ2rμn)V
′′′
n
+
(
μnμr − σ
2
n (r + μr) + σ2r (r + μn)
2
)
V
′′
n
− (μn(r + λr + μr (r + λn))V ′n +
(
r2 + r (λr + λn)
)
Vn = 0 (2.54)
The characteristic equation associated with is
Qn (β)Qr (β) = λnλr (2.55)
where Q(t) (β) = λ(t) + r −
(
μ(t) − (1/2)σ2(t)
)
β − (1/2)σ2(t)β2, ((t) = r, n)
Therefore, the general from of the solution is
Vn (ξ) =
4∑
j=1
Ajξ
βj (2.56)
Vr (ξ) =
4∑
j=1
Ajljξ
βj (2.57)
with
lj = Qn (βj) /λn (2.58)
for j = 1, 2, 3, 4
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By eliminating the negative power of ξ, we have
Vn = A1ξβ1 + A2ξβ2 (2.59)
Vr = A1l1ξβ1 + A2l2ξβ2 (2.60)
We obtain a particular solution
φ (ξ) = λnp
r + λn
− λnξ
r + λn − μn (2.61)
Region1
For ξ1 < ξ < ξ2,
E(dVn) =
1
2σ
2
nξ
2V
′′
n + μnξV
′
n + λr (Vr − Vn) (2.62)
Vr = p − ξ (2.63)
The solution becomes
Vn (ξ) = C1ξγ1 + C2ξγ2 + φ (ξ) (2.64)
where γk (k = r, n)is the real roots of the characteristic equation
q (γ) = λn + r −
(
μn − (1/2)σ2n
)
γ − (1/2)σ2n (2.65)
We obtain a particular solution
φ (ξ) = λnP
r + λn
− λnξ
r + λn − μn (2.66)
With value matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we can determine A1,A2,C1, C2
and the bankruptcy thresholds.
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2. Levered Case
We will focus on a levered case since it is shown that the overall value of levered
bank is greater than the counterpart due to its tax beneﬁt. We are interested in
establishing the state-contingent coupon debt obligations, which has a beneﬁt to
increase the capital in times of ﬁnancial distress. Moreover, we will extend this idea
to contingent convertible bonds whether a comprehension of contingent capital would
rescue the troubled TBTF institutions.
3. Six Scenarios
However, we can expect there exist six diﬀerent scenarios because the diﬀerent volatil-
ity and drifts according to two regimes (Normal and Recession) create six combina-
tions of the order of the bankruptcy thresholds in un-levered and levered banks. The
ﬁrst case, which we have illustrated from Section above, is the usual category which
it is hinted from the simple model (BLR < BLN < BUR < BUN), where B stands
for Bankruptcy Threshold, L, levered, U , Unlevered, N, Good state and R, Recession
Regime. We consider the six scenarios carefully. If the levered bank defaults and
the boundary condition should be met such as D = (1 − α)VU , let (1 − α), where
0 < α < 1, be the fraction of asset value at the time of bankruptcy that debt-holders
receive, leaving equity-holders nothing, VU the value of unlevered bank. However,
the levered bank suddenly switches to another regime then the boundary condition
might not match with this conventional rule. For example, if a bank is suddenly
shifting from normal to recession regime then the value of debt becomes the remain-
ing value of unlevered bank in recession regime (D = (1 − α)V UR). Therefore, we
check carefully whether each scenarios we are considering corresponds to the right
boundary condition for the value of debt-holder in case of bankruptcy depending on
regime switching.
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Figure 2.11: Six diﬀerent scenarios for bankruptcy thresholds
Note: a)ELN0 (Equity, Levered Bank, Normal Region 0), ELN1 (Equity, Levered Bank, Normal
Region 1), ELR (Equity. Levered Bank, Recession )
b)DLN0 (Debt, Levered Bank, Normal Region 0), DLN1 (Debt, Levered Bank, Normal Region 1),
DLR (Debt, Levered Bank, Recession)
c)VUN0(total Firm Value, Un-Levered Bank, Normal Region 0),VUN1(Total Firm Value, Un-Levered
Bank, Normal Region 1),VUR(Total Firm Value, Un-Levered Bank, Recession)
d)BLR(Bankruptcy Threshold, Levered Bank, Recession), BLN(Bankruptcy Threshold, Levered
Bank, Normal),
e)BUR(Bankruptcy Threshold, Un-Levered Bank, Recession) ,BUN(Bankruptcy Threshold, Un-
Levered Bank, Normal)
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Case 1
First, we deﬁne the value of un-levered bank in this case in which the bankruptcy
thresholds are in order of conventional case; both of un-levered bank whether it is in
recession or not are grater than the levered bank, in addition, the value of thresholds
in Good state is greater than the recession. We can represent the coeﬃcients on the
linear equation part while the coeﬃcients on the non-linear part involved in more
complex expression, thus, we will leave them for the appendix.
V UN0 = vun11ξx1 + vun12ξx2 +
(
τe
rn + λn − μn
)
ξ +
(
pn − pnτe
rn + λn
)
(2.67)
V UN1 = vun21ξy1 + vun22ξy2
+
(
λn + (rr + λr − μr)(τe − 1)
λnλr − (rr + λn − μn) (rr + λr − μr)
)
ξ
+
((prλn + pn (rr + λr)) (τe − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
(2.68)
V UR = vur01ξy1 + vur02ξy2
+
(
λr + (rn + λn − μn)(τe − 1)
rr (λn − μn) − λrμn + rn (rr + λr − μr) − λnμr + μnμr
)
ξ (2.69)
+
((pnλr + pr (rn + λn)) (τe − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
With the same analysis from the simple model, we derive the value of debt and
equity in each scenario as well.
ELN0 = eln11ξx1 + eln12ξx2 +
(
τe − 1
rn + λn − μn
)
ξ +
(
cn − pn(τe − 1)
rn + λn
)
(2.70)
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DLN0 = dln11ξx1 + dln12ξx2 + dln05ξy1 + dln06ξy2
+
( (−1 + α)λn
rn + λn − μn
)(
λr + (rn + λn − μn)(τe − 1)
rr (λn − μn) − λrμn + rn (rr + λr − μr) − λnμr + μnμr
)
ξ
+
⎛
⎝ (pnλr+pr(rn+λn))(τe−1)rrλn+rn(rr+λr) (α − 1)λn + cn (τi − 1)
rn + λn
⎞
⎠ (2.71)
The ﬁrst pair of equation are the value of debt and equity in Good state and
Region 0 since E stands for Equity, D for Debt, L for Levered, N for Normal and 0
for Region 0. In the same way, the second pair of equation are the value of debt and
equity of normal bank in Region 1.
ELN1 = eln21ξy1 + eln22ξy2 +
(
λn + (rr + λr − μr) (τe − 1)
λnλr − (rr + λn − μn) (rr + λr − μr)
)
ξ +
+
(((cr − pr)λn + (rr + λr) (cn − pn)) (τe − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
(2.72)
DLN1 = dln21ξy1 + dln22ξy2 +
((crλn + cn (rr + λr)) (τi − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
(2.73)
Lastly, the pair of equations illustrate the value of debt and equity in Recession
bank in region 0 and 1.
ELR = elr01ξy1 + elr02ξy2
+
(
λr + (rn + λn − μn)(τe − 1)
rr (λn − μn) − λrμn + rn (rr + λr − μr) − λnμr + μnμr
)
ξ (2.74)
+
(((cr − pr) (rn + λn) + λr (cn − pn)) (τe − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
DLR = dlr01ξy1 + dlr02ξy2 +
((cnλr + cr (rn + λn)) (τi − 1)
rrλn + rn (rr + λr)
)
(2.75)
where each small letter, n, r stands for n= normal state and r =recession regime.
r= risk-free interest rate, μ= drift of cash ﬂow process λis the probability of entering
each regime. c is coupon rate p is the diﬀerential between lending rate and deposit
rate, τe= eﬀective tax rate for corporate level, τi= tax rate for investors.
First of all, we compare the default triggering levels of risk-sharing PSD and
standard debt by diﬀering the coupon payment according to diﬀerent regimes, for
instance, cn > cr (PSD case) or cn = cr (standard debt case). Also, we compute
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the value of debt, equity and banks in three diﬀerent regions by diﬀering the coupon
payment similar to the ﬁrst computation. In both computations, parameters are
as follows: rn = 0.05, rr = 0.05, σn = 0.2, σr = 0.25, μn = 0, μr = 0.03, λn =
0.01, λr = 0.1, pn = 2, pr = 1, τe = 0.3, τi = 0.35.
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Figure 2.12: Boundary conditions for diﬀerent cases
Note: a)ELN0 (Equity, Levered Bank, Normal Region 0), ELN1 (Equity, Levered Bank, Normal
Region 1), ELR (Equity. Levered Bank, Recession )
b)DLN0 (Debt, Levered Bank, Normal Region 0), DLN1 (Debt, Levered Bank, Normal Region 1),
DLR (Debt, Levered Bank, Recession)
c)VUN0(total Firm Value, Un-Levered Bank, Normal Region 0),VUN1(Total Firm Value, Un-Levered
Bank, Normal Region 1),VUR(Total Firm Value, Un-Levered Bank, Recession)
d)BLR(Bankruptcy Threshold, Levered Bank, Recession), BLN(Bankruptcy Threshold, Levered
Bank, Normal),
e)BUR(Bankruptcy Threshold, Un-Levered Bank, Recession) ,BUN(Bankruptcy Threshold, Un-
Levered Bank, Normal)
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Chapter 3
Liquidity Spirals over Moving
Uncertainty: Evidence from US
Financial Aggregates
We study how the instability of ﬁnancial markets is related to uncertainty.
We take the ﬁnancial aggregate data from US stock markets into a VAR
model, allowing uncertainty to continuously change behind. We ﬁnd that
margin requirements, market liquidity, asset prices all mutually destabilize
only in the times of high uncertainty. Related ﬁndings are that in the
times of low uncertainty, (1) margins and market liquidity rather stabilize
each other; (2) reinforcement between margins and asset prices are much
delayed in eﬀect; and (3) asset prices and market liquidity react little each
other. In brief, uncertainty ﬂuctuations are crucial to understanding how
and when liquidity spirals turn on and oﬀ in US stock markets.
3.1 Introduction
Assets become less resalable when traders have smaller access to funds. And funds
become less available when assets are harder to resale. “Liquidity spirals” of this
kind are now widely considered a central circuit of “instability” mechanism, through
which ﬁnancial markets are often led to turmoil. Reduced accessibility to loans makes
selling and buying assets harder, which pushes asset prices down. And when asset
prices fall, lender’s capital as well as existing borrower’s net worth erodes, which in
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turn leads to a further tightening of lending standards, thereby a further squeeze of
transactions, a further drop of asset prices, and so on. In this way and back to back,
the ease of obtaining funds (funding conditions), the ease of trading assets (market
liquidity), and the value of the fundamentals (asset prices) aﬀect one another. And
possibly under some circumstances, their interaction may be ampliﬁed as much as
bringing ﬁnancial markets into a state of euphoria and of crisis.
Uncertainty may constitute the circumstance. Intuitively, ﬁnancial markets will be
more easily destabilized when it is harder to know the true value of the fundamentals.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model in which funding conditions and
market liquidity can reinforce each other when ﬁnanciers are unsure regarding what
made asset prices move. In this paper, we take the uncertainty to the fore of our
empirical investigation. We ask in data, whether and how the structural relationship
between funding conditions, market liquidity, and asset prices be diﬀerently shaped
depending on the degree of uncertainty. Our empirical investigation is carried out at
the aggregate level of a US ﬁnancial market.
We use monthly data from the US stock market over the 1990-2015 period. All
proxy variables are aggregates. As a proxy for (deterioration of) funding conditions,
we use margin requirements for the S&P500 futures contracts; for market liquidity,
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure for market-wide aggregate liquidity; and for
asset prices, the S&P500 index.1 In addition, to construct quantitatively discernible
circumstances with respect to the degree of uncertainty, we utilize the implied volatil-
ity of the S&P500 index options over the upcoming 30-day period (VIX).
Each of the three ﬁnancial aggregates closely co-moves with the development of
the VIX. As shown in Figure 3.1a, the margin requirements tend to rise immediately
following or preceding the VIX hike around the outbreaks of Gulf War I (1990),
Asian Crisis (1997), LTCM and Russian Crisis (1998), 9/11 Attacks (2001), Corporate
scandals and convictions including Enron’s (2002), and Subprime Crisis and Lehman
Brothers collapse (2008). Similarly, the market-wide aggregate liquidity tends to
decline around the times of the VIX hike (Figure 3.1b); so does the S&P500 index
(Figure 3.1c). Provided that the VIX works well to reﬂect uncertainty prevailing
throughout the ﬁnancial world, this simple presentation clues to the dependence of
1Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s market-wide liquidity measure is one ﬁttest to the notion of
market liquidity among many candidate proxies in the literature. It essentially measures the ability
to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price.
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(a) Margins over the VIX
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(b) Market-wide Liquidity over the VIX
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(c) S&P500 Index over the VIX
Note: The shaded area represents US recessions as deﬁned by the NBER. In all panels, the gray
line shows the VIX, option-price implied volatility of the S&P500 index over the upcoming 30-day
period, which is quoted in percentage points and then annualized. The black line in each panel
represents (a) margin requirements on the S&P500 index futures; (b) 3-month moving average of
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure for market-wide aggregate liquidity; and (c) the S&P500
index, respectively.
Figure 3.1: Financial Aggregates and the VIX
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funding conditions and market liquidity and asset prices on the degree of uncertainty.2
However, the VIX index is a mixed pot of market uncertainty and investors’ risk
appetite. It is indeed referred to a fear gauge in the literature (Whaley, 2000). To
distill market uncertainty, we closely follow Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013)
and decompose it into variance risk premium and conditional volatility. We then
take a continuous mapping of the conditional volatility onto the unit interval (0, 1) to
proxy the “state” of ﬁnancial markets with respect to uncertainty. By this mapping,
the degree of uncertainty assigned becomes of measure 1 and allows a probability-
like interpretation. This construction is related to our empirical method employed
to explore the dependence of liquidity spirals on the uncertainty state of ﬁnancial
markets.
Our investigation is carried out within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework.
We employ a smooth transition vector autoregression (STVAR) model developed by
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). We identify shocks to the ﬁnancial aggregates
and diﬀerentiate their responses under diﬀerent circumstances continuously varying
with respect to the degree of uncertainty. The STVAR has a key advantage over other
methods estimating VAR models for each regime separately: This method allows to
capture continuous variation in the degree of being in a particular regime thereby
utilizing a larger set of observations towards estimation and inference for each regime
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012).
Within our 3-variable VAR, liquidity spirals are deﬁned at the junction of three
feedback links; “margin-liquidity”, “liquidity-price”, and “margin-price”. If markets
turn illiquid in response to a tightening shock to margin requirements and the margin
requirements tighten in response to a negative shock to market liquidity, we say that
a “margin-liquidity” link spirals on; otherwise, oﬀ. If asset prices fall in market
illiquidity and markets turn illiquid in falling asset prices, a “liquidity-price” link is
said to spiral on. If the margins rise in falling asset prices and the asset prices fall in
tightening funding conditions, a “margin-price” link is said to spiral on. At last, if
the three links all spiral on at the same time, it is said that we see liquidity spirals
(the instability mechanism of our interest) at present.
2The VIX yields a contemporaneous correlation of 0.26 with the margin requirements, -0.35 with
the market-wide liquidity, -0.13 with the S&P500 index linearly detrended. Note that the market-
wide liquidity depicted in Figure 3.1b is of a 3-month moving average, with which the correlation
coeﬃcient is -0.53.
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Our study ﬁnds that the liquidity spirals are on and reinforced when ﬁnancial
markets are surrounded with high uncertainty. It is in high uncertainty state only
that the liquidity spirals turn on bringing the three links all into one instability
mechanism. In low uncertainty state, each indivisible spiral is either oﬀ or weak,
being delayed in eﬀect and small in response size. In brief, the theory of liquidity
spirals is conﬁrmed at the aggregate level of ﬁnancial markets. These results are
robust with respect to diﬀerent speciﬁcations in VAR lags and curvature parameters.
The results also hold with diﬀerent ordering of the VAR variables.
However, some may have doubt about appropriateness of the VIX for the present
analysis. Since we want to examine the dependence of liquidity spirals on uncertainty
ﬂuctuations and not vice versa, there may be some endogeneity problem when using
the VIX as a state variable for our STVAR. To address this issue, we repeat the same
analysis using an alternative measure of uncertainty related to “national security”.
Admittedly, wars and terrors are most likely to remain exogenous while aﬀecting the
degree of uncertainty about the true value of the fundamentals. We ﬁnd that our
results remain qualitatively intact.
To our best knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst one that empirically investigates the
presence of liquidity spirals at the aggregate level of ﬁnancial system and highlights
the role of uncertainty in destabilizing ﬁnancial markets. Our study contributes
to a few strands of the existing literature: for example, research areas that study
relationship between stock prices and market volatility, and liquidity contagion across
asset markets, and so on. Our work can also shed light on the (in)eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy by means of liquidity provisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces data and
method and lays out the key speciﬁcations of our regime-switching model. Section 3
documents the key results about the behaviors of ﬁnancial variables across diﬀerent
degree of uncertainty. Section 4 identiﬁes liquidity spirals. Section 5 replaces market
uncertainty with national security uncertainty and shows the robustness of the key
results. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Method
3.2.1 Uncertainty Distilled
Uncertainty is brought to the center of our empirical investigation into ﬁnancial mar-
ket instability mechanism. We are in particular concerned with uncertainty such
that heightens when investors get more unsure about the true source of asset price
movements. Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus what to be the best gauge
of uncertainty (Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng, 2015). But still upon the literature, the
VIX index may be a ﬁrst candidate proxy for the uncertainty in that it represents
the market expectations about the volatility of asset prices over a near future period
(speciﬁcally, implied from a panel of options prices on the S&P500 contracts with a
maturity of one month). A growing body of literature also supports the VIX as a
global state variable underlying co-movements in credit conditions and capital ﬂows
and asset prices across diﬀerent economies.3
Nevertheless, inherently to its construction, the VIX contains both market un-
certainty and risk appetite components (Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou, 2011; Nagel,
2012; Bekaert and Hoerova, 2014). It is constructed on the basis of a risk-neutral
probability measure, which takes probability mass further to bad states where risk-
averse investors draw higher marginal utility. The expected future realized variance
based on the actual physical probability measure will be a better proxy for the market
uncertainty. That is, we want to obtain Et[RVt+1], where Et[·] denotes the expecta-
tions operator conditional on date t information set and RVt+1 is the S&P500 realized
variance in date t + 1.
We estimate the conditional volatility by applying a simple projection method.
We follow Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014)
and choose a two-variable model utilizing the past squared VIX and the past realized
variance as predictors:
RVt = α + β1V IX2t−1 + β2RVt−1 + t, (3.1)
where t is assumed to follow an i.i.d. process with mean zero and a constant standard
deviation.4 The conditional volatility is obtained as the ﬁtted values from this pro-
3See, for example, Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008); Rey (2013); Bruno and Shin
(2014a,b).
4For the relative performance of this simple projection over other methods, refer to Bekaert,
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jection. In Section 3.2.3 later, we deﬁne regimes (and regime-switching) with respect
to the degree of uncertainty on the basis of a cumulative movement of the estimated
conditional volatility.
3.2.2 Financial Aggregates
Variables of our primary interest are funding conditions, market liquidity, and asset
prices. We use US ﬁnancial aggregates over the sample period from January 1990
(the ﬁrst appearance of the risk-neutral VIX series) until December 2015.
Regarding funding conditions, we choose margin requirements for the S&P500 fu-
tures. Increased margins represent deterioration of funding conditions in US ﬁnancial
markets. Speciﬁcally, the margins are expressed as a percentage fraction of the un-
derlying S&P500 index value multiplied by the size of the contract. This construction
ﬁts into the notion of funding liquidity (the ease of obtaining funds), which is modeled
as “speculator’s shadow cost of capital” in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Initial
and maintenance margins are the same for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
members. The data is available from the CME website.
Regarding market liquidity, we adopt Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s measure.
Unlike other liquidity proxies, their liquidity measure takes into account the property
of return reversal: i.e., the more liquid a stock is, the quicker its price impacts die
out for a given trading volume. This liquidity indicator ﬁts well into our notion of
market liquidity (the ease of trading assets), essentially measuring the ease of trading
large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the prices. Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) obtain an estimate for each of individual stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and take
an equal-weighted average over them to construct a market-wide aggregate liquidity.
The monthly data is available from the website of either author.
Regarding asset prices, we use the S&P500 index, of which total market capital-
ization amounts to a fairly large fraction of US equity markets. We obtain monthly
data by averaging daily closing prices.
It might be worth to mention that among the three ﬁnancial aggregates, the two
proxies for market liquidity and asset prices are from equity markets and the one
Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014). Note also that our study uses daily
closing prices data to obtain a series of monthly realized variance, whereas they use 5-minute returns
data and sum daily realized variances to obtain a monthly series.
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for funding conditions is from futures contracts. Unfortunately, margin requirements
for US stocks are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (so called Regulation T)
and have little changed over the past four decades. In this respect, margins for US
equity trading do not reﬂect the continuously changing forces and conditions of the
ﬁnancial markets. So we choose margin requirements for futures contracts, of which
underlying asset is the representative US equity basket, the S&P500 index.
3.2.3 Smooth Transition VAR
We study the interplay between these ﬁnancial aggregates within a VAR framework.
Let FC denote the log of the margin requirements, LIQ the log of 1 plus the market-
wide liquidity, and PRI the log of the S&P500 index.5 We set Yt =[FCt, PRIt,
LIQt] for our benchmark speciﬁcation. By this ordering, we assume that shocks to
the S&P500 index and the market-wide liquidity have no contemporaneous eﬀect
on the margin requirements; and that shocks to the market-wide liquidity have no
contemporaneous eﬀect on the margins and the S&P500 index. This identifying
assumption is consistent with the CME’s margin policy, which is slowly implemented
as described in Park and Abruzzo (2015). The ordering between the S&P500 index
and the market-wide liquidity is made rather in consideration of information ﬂow
that changes in the asset prices are contemporaneously reﬂected on to the market-
wide liquidity measure. Besides, we will also carry out robustness exercise with an
alternative ordering of the variables.
The ﬁnancial aggregates Yt =[FCt, PRIt, LIQt] and the uncertainty distilled above
are brought together to a regime-switching model. We allow the ﬁnancial world to
shift continuously with respect to the degree of uncertainty and employ a smooth
transition vector autoregression (STVAR) model developed by Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012).6 The basic speciﬁcation with autoregression lag 1 is expressible as
5We add 1 piece-wise to the market-wide liquidity from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) before taking
logarithm because its original series ﬂuctuates around 0. Its mean is -0.023 ranging between -0.334
and 0.201 over the 1990M01-2015M12 period. So while the impulse responses of FC and PRI can be
typically read in percentage deviations from the long-run values of their corresponding original series,
the case of LIQ should be read from the long-run value of 1 plus Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)’s
market-wide liquidity (or alternatively, as approximate deviations in level/100 from the long-run
value of the original series).
6Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) use the STVAR to examine how diﬀerent the eﬀects are
that ﬁscal policy have on the aggregate output in recession and expansion. We also utilize their
Matlab code available in the publisher’s website.
93
follows:
Yt = AL(L)Yt−1FL(zt−1) + AH(L)Yt−1FH(zt−1) + ut, (3.2)
with ut ∼ N(0, Σt) subject to
Σt = ΣLFL(zt−1) + ΣHFH(zt−1), (3.3)
and
FL(zt) + FH(zt) = 1 for all t.
AL(L) and AH(L) are lag polynomials that represent the VAR coeﬃcients in two
regimes, labeled “low uncertainty” L and “high uncertainty” H, respectively. ΣL and
ΣH are variance-covariance matrices of disturbances in the two regimes. zt is the log
of the date t conditional volatility obtained from the projection (3.1). We use it with
one period lag to prevent “contemporaneous” feedback from the key variables to the
uncertainty index.
FL(·) and FH(·) are a continuous mapping from the uncertainty index zt onto the
unit interval (0, 1) and represent the weights of being in low and high uncertainty
regimes, respectively. We assume a logistic function
FL(zt) =
exp
[
−θ
(
zt−μz
σz
)]
1 + exp
[
−θ
(
zt−μz
σz
)] ,
and
FH(zt) =
1
1 + exp
[
−θ
(
zt−μz
σz
)] ,
where θ > 0 is a curvature parameter that governs how abruptly the ﬁnancial regime
switches from one to the other when the uncertainty index zt moves over time. μz
and σz are the mean and standard deviation of the uncertainty index, respectively.
We take them for normalization.
Figure 3.2 shows the historical weights on the high uncertainty regime, FH(zt).
There are two notable features: First, the ﬁnancial world has been faced by uncer-
tainty not only immediately following the several major events but also often between
these events. For example, we can see the uncertainty surge several times between
Corporate scandals (2002) and Lehman Brothers collapse (2008). But this period
has long been regarded to be a second half of the Great Moderation out of the entire
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Note: The line represents the weights on the high uncertainty regime, FH(zt). The curvature pa-
rameter θ is set to 2.
Figure 3.2: Historical Weight on High Uncertainty Regime FH(zt)
Greenspan era. Second, the measured degree of uncertainty between LTCM (1998)
and 9/11 Attacks (2001) and Corporate scandals (2002) are heightened as much as
the uncertainty during the 2007-08 global ﬁnancial crisis. In brief, for the given map-
ping of the conditional volatility, the episodes of such heightened uncertainty are not
of a rare phenomenon but rather historically some frequent ones. 44% of the total
number of the observations has more weights on the high uncertainty regime (i.e.,
FH(zt) > 0.5), and the remaining 56% is the observations with FL(zt) > 0.5.
In this STVAR, ΣL and AL(L) describe the behavior of the ﬁnancial world a
fairly certain regime (i.e., FL(zt) → 1 and FH(zt) → 0) and ΣH and AH(L) the
behavior under a suﬃciently uncertain regime (i.e., FL(zt) → 0 and FH(zt) → 1). The
key advantage of this method is that through the continuous regime-weight function
FL(zt) = 1−FH(zt), it enables us to utilize a larger set of observations for estimation
and inference relative to other methods estimating structural VARs for each regime
separately. With respect to estimation of this model, we use an MCMC method
developed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003), which pins down a global optimum in
terms of ﬁt under regular conditions. Our estimation is based on 100,000 draws while
burning the ﬁrst 20% draws of them.
Our benchmark STVAR sets the curvature parameter θ to 2 and the VAR lag
length to 2 and includes time trends and regime-speciﬁc intercepts. We will also
conduct sensitivity analysis and robustness exercises and with various speciﬁcations.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Impulse Responses
Our investigation into the ﬁnancial instability mechanism with our 3-variable STVAR
is based on the analysis of impulse responses across the two diﬀerent fundamental
states: high vs. low uncertainty regimes. Figure 3.3 presents the impulse responses
of the ﬁnancial aggregates in the two uncertainty regimes over the 24-month horizon.
It is also organized in a matrix form according to the ordering of the three variables,
Yt =[FCt, PRIt, LIQt]. As constructed in Section 3.2.3 (and aforementioned in foot-
note 5), while the impulse responses of FC, PRI, and LIQ can be typically read in
percentage deviations from the long-run paths for their corresponding original se-
ries, the case of LIQ should be seen from the long-run path for 1 plus Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003)’s market-wide liquidity.
Reading out Figure 3.3, one can follow shocks in the rows and responses in the
columns. A cell in the i-th row and j-th column, (i, j), indicates the behavior of the
j-th variable in Yt in response to a one-percent deviation shock to the i-th variable
identiﬁed in the shaded column. In each cell, the line with triangles (circles) represents
the impulse responses of the variables under the high (low) uncertainty regime. The
experiments are made with a positive shock to the margins and a negative shock to
each of the S&P500 index and the market-wide liquidity: that is, shocks are released
to the direction of tightening funding conditions, falling asset prices, and drying
market liquidity. We focus on the median impulse responses and, where worth to
mention the conﬁdence bands, will refer to appropriate ﬁgures in Appendix.
Shock to Funding Conditions
Consider ﬁrst the impact of a positive shock to margin requirements. Under both un-
certainty regimes, the margins jump up on impact in response to their own innovation
and then decline towards the long-run value (see the cell (1,1)). But the adjustment
speed diﬀers between the two regimes. In the low uncertainty regime, the margins
show a further shoot-up in the 2nd month and after then fairly quickly return to the
long-run value, leading to the half-life of the shock impact in 8 months. In the high
uncertainty regime, the adjustment to the long-run value is far more persistent and
the half-life of the shock impact occurs almost in 24 months. This diﬀerence implies
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes (high UC and low
UC). The curvature parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 2. The trend and regime-speciﬁc
intercept are included. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses of the Financial Aggregates (STVAR)
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that when the ﬁnancial markets are faced by high uncertainty, the margin setters
(central clearing parties) become more hesitant to resume the initial requirements
and thus the deterioration of funding conditions last longer. However, notice that
since the impulse responses are symmetrically mirrored between negative and posi-
tive shocks in our model, this result also means that once unexpectedly relaxed, the
funding conditions tend to stay loosened longer in the high uncertainty regime.7
To the same margin shock, the asset prices respond diﬀerently under diﬀerent
regimes (see the cell (1,2)). In the high uncertainty regime, the asset prices fall on
impact in response to the tightening of margin requirements and reached the lowest
in 17 months. In the low uncertainty regime, the asset prices rise on impact and take
6 months to fall below the long-run trend in response to the margin increase. This
peculiar behavior of the asset prices for the early periods may be because investors
can better see the true source of asset price movements when the ﬁnancial markets are
faced by low uncertainty.8 Then, the asset prices may not necessarily fall in response
to increased margins until the fundamentals remain ﬁne. However, the tightened
funding conditions will eventually exert downward pressure on the asset prices either
by making the fundamentals actually hurt or by making the asset trading hard. As
shown, the asset prices make the largest deviation in the 19th month under the low
uncertainty regime and their recovery path afterward nearly meets the one from the
high uncertainty regime. Nevertheless, throughout the entire horizon, the downward
deviations of the asset prices are smaller in the low uncertainty regime.
The market-wide liquidity also shows contrasting responses between the two regimes
(see the cell (1,3)). In the low uncertainty regime, the market-wide liquidity makes
little movement in response to a tightening margin shock particularly for the ﬁrst
two months. It starts falling in 3 months, makes the largest deviation at -0.05% in
5 months, and returns to its long-run level in 18 months. In the high uncertainty
regime, the response of the market-wide liquidity is immediate. It drops on impact
up to -0.25% and turn back in 3 months to 0.04% above from the long-run path.
7It is also noteworthy that in the existing literature, margins are found more likely to anchor for a
while when increased than when decreased (see, for example, Dudley and Nimalendran, 2011). Even
though not directly dealt with in our framework, the asymmetric stickiness between the diﬀerent
signs of margin changes can be easily inferred from our result as far as funding conditions are more
often tightened during the times of high uncertainty.
8Indeed, the 90% conﬁdence band for the asset price responses is much narrower in the low
uncertainty regime. See Figure A1 and A2 from Appendix and compare the two conﬁdence bands in
the upper-middle panels.
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After then, the market-wide liquidity shows considerable stickiness and only slowly
return to the long-run value. As such, the impulse responses of the liquidity under
the two regimes diﬀer very much in all aspects; size, timing, and converging path.
The maximum drop under the high uncertainty regime is more than 5 times larger
than under the low uncertainty regime. It occurs on impact when uncertainty is high
but takes 5 months when uncertainty is low. Moreover, the converging paths to the
long-run value are mirrored across the two regimes.
Shock to Asset Prices
Now consider a negative shock to the S&P500 index. The margin requirements are
tightened in response to this loss shock under both uncertainty regimes (see the cell
(2,1)). However, the margins setters are much quicker to increase the margins and to
much tighter extent when they are faced by high uncertainty. In the high uncertainty
regime, the maximum deviation occurs in 5 months by 0.59% above from the long-run
path. In fact, throughout the entire horizon, the funding conditions remain tighter
in the high uncertainty regime. In the low uncertainty regime, it takes 16 months
to have the maximum response up to 0.24% deviation. This result is consistent with
Park and Abruzzo (2015), who ﬁnd that the central clearing parties are quicker to
raise margin requirements when the markets are more volatile.
In response to the initial loss, the asset prices fall on impact under both regimes
(see the cell (2,2)). But after then, the impulse responses are diverging between the
two regimes. In the high uncertainty, the asset prices fall further in 2 and 3 months
followed by a gradual return towards the long-run path throughout the remaining
horizon, resulting in a large overall impact of the loss shock. In the low uncertainty,
the asset prices start to recover in the 2nd month without hesitance but their af-
terward adjustments get much more sluggish. In other words, while the asset prices
seem to have no doubt as to where they head for, their steps are heavy under the
low uncertainty regime. This may reﬂect the regime’s underlying feature: Investors
can better see now where the initial loss shock stems from, and consider the shock
this time that hit directly the asset prices as a shock to the fundamentals rather than
liquidity shocks.
The same initial loss reduces the market-wide liquidity under the both regimes(see
the cell (2,3)). And the overall patterns of the impulse responses appear similar
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between the two regimes. In the high uncertainty regime, just like a skillful diver in
a swimming pool, the market-wide liquidity dives deep up to -0.31% on impact and
stays underwater long before up the surface in the 4th month. In the low uncertainty
regime, the market-wide liquidity falls only by -0.10% and bounces up the surface
just after that, in the second month. It almost returns to its long-run path after
a brief oscillation in 2-3 months. Overall, the market-wide liquidity under the high
uncertainty regime goes through a far larger swing following a loss shock to the asset
prices.
Shock to Market Liquidity
Release now a negative shock to the market-wide liquidity. Across the two regimes,
the responses of the margin requirements are strikingly contrasting (see the cell (3,1)).
In the high uncertainty regime, the margins increase following the shock, make a brief
oscillation between the 2-5th month, and then reach maximum deviation in 6 months
followed by gradual returning towards the long-run path. To the contrary, in the low
uncertainty regime, the margins make the largest drop in 2 months after the shock
and take on a gradual rise towards the long-run path.9 The margin responses in the
low uncertainty regime may reﬂect that all market participants including the margin
setters can better see where the shock is from; this time, not from the fundamentals
but from liquidity disturbance. In fact, the CME makes it clear that margins on
futures contracts are set according to their “review of market volatility to ensure ad-
equate collateral coverage” (CME, 2016, Performance Bond Rates Advisory Notice).
This margin behavior is central to preventing the ﬁnancial system from breaking down
due to unexpected liquidity shocks and plays a key role in stabilizing the ﬁnancial
system when the markets are faced by relatively low uncertainty.
The asset prices are pulled down by the liquidity shock under both regimes, but
the magnitude of asset price depression diﬀers very much (see the cell (3,2)). In the
high uncertainty regime, the asset prices keep falling for 4 consecutive months before
resuming upward movements towards the long-run path throughout the remaining
horizon. In the low uncertainty regime, the asset prices drop little to the liquidity
shock and statistically do not deviate from their long-run path, throughout almost the
9In fact, from the 3rd month on, the margin responses under the low uncertainty regime turn
out not statistically deviating from their long-run path at the 5% signiﬁcance level. See the impulse
responses with the 90% conﬁdence band in Figure A2 from Appendix.
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entire horizon, at the 5% signiﬁcance level (see Figure A2 in Appendix). Again, this
response may be attributable to the underlying feature of the low uncertainty regime:
Investors can better understand that the initial loss in their existing positions are due
to an unexpected liquidity shock rather than a shock to the fundamental value of the
assets they trade.
The market-wide liquidity to its own shock are resilient across the two regimes
(see the cell (3,3)). Under both uncertainty regimes, the market liquidity plummets
on impact in response to its own innovation and then start to rebound towards the
long-run value. Some minor diﬀerences are found along the converging path: A full
return to the long-run value occurs in the 5th month without any wobbling in the
low uncertainty regime, whereas in the high uncertainty regime it takes 9 months
going through oscillatory adjustments. The resulting behaviors to its own innovation
across the two regimes are consistent with the impulse responses of the market-wide
liquidity to the other two shocks.
3.3.2 Robustness
We conduct robustness exercises in several directions by (i) increasing the sharp-
ness of regime switching in the benchmark STVAR, (ii) varying the VAR lag length,
(iii) including regime-speciﬁc trends in the benchmark STVAR, (iv) removing regime-
speciﬁc constant terms in the benchmark STVAR; and (v) using an alternative order-
ing of the three variables. Overall, the results from the benchmark model essentially
remain unchanged with these variations. Refer to Appendix (Figure A3 ~ A8).
3.4 Liquidity Spirals
We bring the analysis of impulse responses into the examination of liquidity spirals. In
the analysis of impulse responses above, we trace the consequential behaviors of vari-
ables in response to one-oﬀ occurrence of orthogonal shocks identiﬁed with our VAR
framework. The responses of a variable A to an orthogonal shock to another variable
B and the responses of B to an orthogonal shock to A are presented independently of
one another. But the estimated VAR coeﬃcients on which the impulse responses are
based summarize their best-ﬁt relationships while cause-and-eﬀects running in either
direction.
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We now draw attention to a bilateral link between A and B by combining A’s
responses to shock B and B’s responses to shock A. We deﬁne liquidity spirals in terms
of three indivisible links within our 3-variable STVAR: (1) A “margin-liquidity” spiral
arises if markets turn illiquid in response to a tightening shock to margin requirements
and the margins increase in response to a negative shock to market liquidity. (2) A
“margin-price” spiral arises if the margins rise in response to a negative shock to asset
prices and asset prices fall in response to a tightening shock to funding conditions.
(3) A “liquidity-price” spiral arises if market turn illiquid in response to a negative
shock to asset prices and asset prices fall in response to a negative shock to market
liquidity. Our interest is as to whether and how these spirals behave diﬀerently across
the states of low and high uncertainty. Liquidity spirals, the instability mechanism
as a whole of our interest, turn on if the three indivisible links are all at work at the
same time.
As investigations proceeded below, keep reminded of that impulse responses under
each regime are symmetric with respect to the signs of a shock.
3.4.1 Three Indivisible Links
Margin-Liquidity Spiral
A margin-liquidity spiral can be examined by looking into Figure 3.3’s cell (1,3) and
(3,1) jointly, collected now in Figure 3.4 for convenience. In the low uncertainty
regime, a tightening shock to funding conditions induces markets to turn illiquid in a
few months but the funding conditions are rather relaxed immediately following an
illiquidity shock. As a result, within this link, the times when liquidity shocks and
liquidity responses take oﬀ in the same direction are likely to fall into the times when
margin shocks and margin responses tend to neutralize their own movements. And
the times when margin shocks and margin responses strengthen their own movements
tend to be when liquidity responses and liquidity shocks move on to the opposite
direction. In this way, margins and market liquidity stabilize each other in the low
uncertainty regime. In brief, a margin-liquidity spiral turns oﬀ when the markets are
faced by relatively low uncertainty.
To the contrary, in the high uncertainty regime, a tightening shock to funding
conditions induces markets to immediately turn illiquid (for the ﬁrst couple of months)
and an illiquidity shock leads to a tightening of funding conditions. Within this
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Note: Figure 3.3’s cell (1,3) and (3,1) are replicated. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical
axis is in percent.
Figure 3.4: Margin-Liquidity Spiral On and Oﬀ
link, if margin shocks and margin responses happen to move in the same direction,
liquidity shocks and liquidity responses are also likely to reinforce themselves, leading
to a sudden liquidity dry-up or surge-up. In this way, margins and market liquidity
destabilize each other when markets are faced by high uncertainty.
Still possibly, however, if two mutually stabilizing shocks (e.g., a tightening fund-
ing shock and a positive liquidity shock) hit the markets at the same time, margins
and market liquidity will tend to cancel oﬀ each other, thereby spiraling eﬀects paused
even in the high uncertainty regime. This scenario has an important policy implica-
tion in line of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernstein, Hughson, and Weidenmier
(2011). Fed’s monetary policy leaning against the wind by means of liquidity pro-
visions can help stop vicious reinforcement cycles emerging on the space of funding
constraints and market liquidity. Its potentials for market stabilization will be more
eﬀective especially when there surrounds high uncertainty in the ﬁnancial markets.
Margin-Price Spiral
A margin-price spiral can be also examined in the same manner, by looking into
the cell (1,2) and (2,1) together, now collected in Figure 3.5. In the low uncertainty
regime, a negative price shock tightens funding conditions but a tightening (loosening)
shock to funding conditions rather boosts (reduces) asset prices for the ﬁrst several
months. As a mirror, a positive price shock makes funding conditions loosened but a
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(b) Figure 3.3: cell (2,1)
Note: Figure 3.3’s cell (1,2) and (2,1) are replicated. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical
axis is in percent.
Figure 3.5: Margin-Price Spiral On and Oﬀ
loosening (tightening) shock to funding conditions makes asset prices fall (rise). For
all possible sets of shocks and responses within this link, margins and asset prices
will not be led to a reinforcement loop. A margin-price spiral turns oﬀ in the low
uncertainty regime.
In the high uncertainty regime, a negative (positive) price shock quickly tightens
(loosens) funding conditions and at the same time, a tightening (loosening) shock to
funding conditions suppresses (boosts) asset prices. As a result, margins and asset
prices destabilize each other and a margin-price spiral emerges when the markets are
faced by high uncertainty. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) call such a reinforce-
ment loop between margins and prices “loss spirals”, which arise in the time of high
uncertainty. An initial loss shock erodes investors’ existing positions, which makes
margin setters concerned about further losses and actively review their current mar-
gin requirements. Increased margins put de-leveraging pressure upon the investors
trading on margin, leading them to prompt selling, further price drops, further losses,
and further increase in margins. Such a margin-price spiral is also found in Wang
(2015), who shows binding long margin requirements reduce stock purchases and thus
drive price down.
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Figure 3.6: Liquidity-Price Spiral On and Oﬀ
Liquidity-Price Spiral
A liquidity-price spiral can be easily demonstrated jointly from the cell (2,3) and
(3,2), or from Figure 3.5. In the low uncertainty regime, asset prices respond little
to a liquidity shock and market liquidity re-bounces immediately after one-oﬀ drop
to a negative price shock. Within this link, the interplay between market liquidity
and asset prices tend to be transitory. A liquidity-price spiral is just a spell and soon
turns oﬀ, keeping the ﬁnancial markets near a stable equilibrium.
To the contrary, in the high uncertainty regime, asset prices keep falling for several
months in row to an illiquidity shock and market liquidity is squeezed to a negative
price shock. Within this link, whenever liquidity shocks and liquidity responses take
place in the same direction, price shocks and price responses will also push further
their movements together, leading to price bubble or burst. In this way, market
liquidity and asset prices destabilize each other in the high uncertainty regime. A
liquidity-price spiral can be further strengthened when markets are populated by
assets with short investment horizon and/or when investors (like hedge funds and in-
stitutional investors) have to comply with pre-set rules on tolerance level of volatility,
risk, and so on (Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti, 2013).
Nevertheless, like with a margin-liquidity spiral above, if two mutually stabilizing
shocks (e.g., a negative price shock and a positive liquidity shock) hit the markets at
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the same time, each side of asset prices and market liquidity will move to neutralize
the other side’s movements even in the high uncertainty regime. This leads to an
important policy implication about Fed’s potential role in stabilizing the ﬁnancial
markets. That is, when there surrounds high uncertainty in the ﬁnancial markets,
Fed’s policy of liquidity provisions leaning against the wind can help cut in downward
spirals emerging on the space of asset prices and market liquidity.
3.4.2 Liquidity Spirals and Uncertainty
Liquidity spirals emerge where the three indivisible links are all at work. Margins
are destabilizing if they increase in illiquidity. Liquidity is destabilizing if it decreases
in margins. A margin-liquidity spiral turns on then. As shown, this is when high
uncertainty faces markets. Margins are also destabilizing if they increase in asset
price drop. Asset prices are destabilizing if they fall in margins. A margin-price
spiral turns on then. This is observed again when there surrounds high uncertainty
in the markets. Liquidity is destabilizing if it decreases in asset price drop. Asset
prices are also destabilizing if they fall in illiquidity. A liquidity-price spiral turns on
then. We have shown it in the high uncertainty regime.
Lenders and margin setters tend to tighten funding conditions when markets
face high volatility (CME, 2016). Reduced accessibility to funds makes selling and
buying assets harder (margin-liquidity), which leads asset prices to fall (liquidity-
price). And when the asset prices fall, lenders’ capital as well as borrowers’ existing
positions erodes, which in turn leads to a further tightening of lending standards
(price-margin). This will cause a further squeeze of transactions (margin-liquidity),
a further drop of asset prices (liquidity-price), and so on. Such a complete form of
reinforcement loops tend to be born primarily when high uncertainty faces markets.
Regarding the important role of uncertainty, Bernstein, Hughson, and Weiden-
mier (2011) take a diﬀerent angle but reach the same conclusion with ours. Using
the 19th and early 20th century data as natural experiments, Bernstein, Hughson,
and Weidenmier (2011) highlight the interplay among funding constraint, market liq-
uidity and stock prices. They ﬁnd that some reinforcement loops exist among these
variables, in particular, during the “harvest season” when asset market volatility was
higher than other periods of year. Doing a dynamic VAR analysis, they uncover that a
positive shock from funding constraint reduces both market liquidity and stock prices
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and a negative shock from stock prices also reduce market liquidity whereas funding
liquidity is only aﬀected by the external factor, the harvest season and real shocks.
They draw attention to the role of central banks, which could potentially prevent
spiraling eﬀects and ﬁnancial crises by adjusting funding conditions and combine the
history of US. Bernstein, Hughson, and Weidenmier (2011) show that the interactions
among the key ﬁnancial variables weaken when a lender of last resort was present.
3.5 Uncertainty Measure
In this paper, we have brought uncertainty to the fore of our empirical investigation
about the instability mechanism. However, there might be some measurement issues
regarding uncertainty proxy. First, derivation of uncertainty from the VIX may be
coarse and imperfect. Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) derive conditional
volatility using a 5-minute tick data, while we use daily return data. Moreover,
their simple projection method is a rule of thumb in practice. Second, when using
the distilled component from the VIX as uncertainty proxy, we encounter additional
identiﬁcation problems to disentangle shocks to each VAR variable from shocks to
the VAR regime. As well known, the VIX co-moves with almost all ﬁnancial variables
such as credit conditions, capital ﬂows, and asset prices across diﬀerent economies
(Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2008; Rey, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2014a,b).
It also tightly co-moves with each of the three ﬁnancial aggregates, as presented
in Figure 3.1. The ﬁnancial aggregates are all too drawn from the same basket of
US stocks and derivatives (the S&P500 index and futures) and the VIX is too from
the S&P500 index options. This close co-movement has pros and cons: (pros) to
represent uncertainty prevailing in the ﬁnancial market; (cons) to mix up casual
direction between liquidity spirals and uncertainty.
We want to examine the dependence of liquidity spirals on uncertainty ﬂuctua-
tions and not vice versa. To avoid such endoegeneity issue between VAR variables
and VAR regime, we alternatively take a measure of uncertainty related to “national
security”. This uncertainty index reﬂects US public concerns with national security,
being constructed on newspaper appearance of security-speciﬁc terms such as war,
military conﬂict, terrorism, and so on.10 This measure ﬁts into the purpose of the
10The full list of related terms for this category includes national security, war, military conﬂict,
terrorism, terror, 9/11, defense spending, military spending, police action, armed forces, base closure,
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Note: The line represents the weights on the high risk-aversion regime, FH(zt). The curvature
parameter θ is set to 2.
Figure 3.7: Historical Weight on High Uncertainty on US National Security
present study because wars and terrors are most likely to remain exogenous while
aﬀecting the degree of uncertainty about the true value of the fundamentals. This
property helps us examine the dependence of liquidity spirals (the structural relation-
ship) on uncertainty (the regime), with little inﬂuence the other way around. The
use of alternative measure helps also address the ﬁtness of the decomposition method
indirectly.
We bring the series in log into the STVAR system made of equations (3.2) and
(3.3) together with a continuous mapping FL(zt) = 1 − FH(zt) as deﬁned before.
Now zt = log(Uncertainty on US National Security). We keep all the other VAR
speciﬁcations the same as made in our benchmark STVAR.
Figure 3.7 shows the historical weights on the high uncertainty regime w.r.t. US
national security, FH(zt). Compared with the history of uncertainty in Figure 3.2,
the degree of national security uncertainty closely co-moves with the events includ-
ing Gulf War I, 9/11 Attacks, Corporate scandals and recently Euro-zone Sovereign
Crisis. However, for other times of crisis including Mexican Crisis, Asian Crisis, the
national security uncertainty seem not very much related to market uncertainty. So
the diﬀerence between the two uncertainty proxies is found mostly in the 1990s.
Figure 3.8 depicts the impulse responses of ﬁnancial aggregates across diﬀerent
degree of national security uncertainty. Again, the three indivisible links can be
military procurement, saber rattling, naval blockade, military embargo, no-ﬂy zone, military invasion.
The monthly index is available from the website of Economic Policy Uncertainty. Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016) detail their methodology.
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes (high UC and low
UC). The curvature parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 2. The trend and regime-speciﬁc
intercept are included. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses across National Security Uncertainty Regimes
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examined from each set of the cells: {(1,3), (3,1)} for margin-liquidity, {(1,2), (2,1)}
for margin-price, and {(2,3), (3,2)} for liquidity-price. One most notable feature is
that a margin-price link shows now far more contrast between the two regimes. In
the low uncertainty regime on national security, asset prices slightly rise to tightening
funding conditions and the margins fall slightly in response to falling asset prices.
This makes the ﬁnancial system as a whole far stable against shocks. In the high
uncertainty regime, the margin-price link becomes destabilizing to a greater extent
compared to the previous one with market uncertainty. We also ﬁnd that liquidity-
price link looks more contrasting between the two diﬀerent regimes.
The common results from the two diﬀerent measures jointly conﬁrm that uncer-
tainty ﬂuctuations are crucial to understanding how and when liquidity spirals turn
on and oﬀ in US stock markets.
3.6 Conclusions
We take uncertainty to the fore of our empirical investigation into the nature of
ﬁnancial market instability mechanism. We ask, whether and how the ease of obtain-
ing funds (funding conditions) and the ease of trading assets (market liquidity) and
the value of the fundamentals (asset prices) take diﬀerent relationships depending
on the amount of uncertainty prevailing in the ﬁnancial markets. To this aim, we
have boiled down the ﬁnancial world into a 3-variable VAR that allows uncertainty
to continuously change.
Using the US ﬁnancial aggregates, we ﬁnd that funding conditions, market liquid-
ity, asset prices all mutually destabilize only in the times of high uncertainty. Related
ﬁndings are that in the times of low uncertainty, (1) funding conditions and market
liquidity rather stabilize each other; (2) reinforcement between funding conditions
and asset prices are much delayed in eﬀect; and (3) asset prices and market liquid-
ity react little each other. In brief, we conﬁrm Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)’s
theory of liquidity spirals from the aggregate level.
To our best knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst one that empirically investigates the
presence of liquidity spirals at the aggregate level of ﬁnancial system and highlights
the role of uncertainty in destabilizing ﬁnancial markets. Our study contributes
to a few strands of the existing literature: for example, research areas that study
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relationship between stock prices and market volatility, and liquidity contagion across
asset markets, and so on. Our work can also shed light on the (in)eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy by means of liquidity provisions. For example, in the model of ?,
the interdependence between funding conditions and market liquidity is central to
shaping the ability of central banks to aﬀect real economic activities.
In theory, a central bank has real eﬀects in our economy not by its direct inter-
vention to borrowers’ constraints but by its right to control the composition of liquid
assets, that is, by taking relatively illiquid assets onto its own books and bringing
relatively more liquid assets into our economy. People, then with improved market
liquidity, ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to allocate additional capital to illiquid assets that they
would not hold otherwise, and in doing so help ﬁnance even physically irreversible
capital investment. Our empirical investigation clues that the central bank’s policy
eﬀectiveness in helping the economy stay around a stable equilibrium will also de-
pend on the way of pausing spiraling eﬀects among key ﬁnancial variables especially
during the times of high uncertainty. This is particularly relevant today when Fed’s
credibility is seriously challenged.
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A1. Conﬁdence Intervals (High Uncertainty Regime)
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under the high uncertainty regime. The shaded area
represents the 90% conﬁdence interval. The curvature parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag
length 2. The trend and regime-speciﬁc intercept are included. The horizontal axis is in months.
The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A1. Impulse Responses under High Uncertainty Regime
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A2. Conﬁdence Intervals (Low Uncertainty Regime)
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under the low uncertainty regime. The shaded area repre-
sents the 90% conﬁdence interval. The curvature parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 2.
The trend and regime-speciﬁc intercept are included. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical
axis is in percent.
Figure A2. Impulse Responses under Low Uncertainty Regime
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A3. Curvature Parameter (small)
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes. The curvature
parameter θ is set to 1 and the VAR lag 2. The trend and regime-speciﬁc intercepts are included.
The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A3. IRAs with θ = 1
114
A4. Curvature Parameter (large)
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes. The curvature
parameter θ is set to 3 and the VAR lag 2. The trend and regime-speciﬁc intercepts are included.
The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A4. IRAs with θ = 3
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A5. VAR lag length
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes. The curvature
parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 3. The trend and regime-speciﬁc intercept are
included. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A5. IRAs with the VAR lag length 3
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A6. Regime-speciﬁc Intercepts Removed
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes. The curvature
parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 2. The trend is included without regime-speciﬁc
constant terms. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A6. IRAs without regime-speciﬁc intercepts
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A7. Regime-speciﬁc Trends Included
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Note: The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses of the three ﬁnancial aggregates to a one-percent
deviation shock to each of the aggregates under each of the uncertainty regimes. The curvature
parameter θ is set to 2 and the VAR lag length 2. Apart from time trend in common, regime-speciﬁc
trend and intercept are included. The horizontal axis is in months. The vertical axis is in percent.
Figure A7. IRAs with regime-speciﬁc trends
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